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Of course, the law is not the place for the artist or the poet. The law
is the calling of thinkers. But to those who believe with me that not
the least godlike of man's activities is the large survey of causes,
that to know is not less than tofeel, I say-and I say no longer with
any doubt-that a man may live greatly in the law as well as else-
where; that there as well as elsewhere his thought may find its unity
in an infinite perspective; that there as well as elsewhere he may
wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup of heroism, may
wear his heart out after the unattainable.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes*
[T]o be judicious is to be weak, and to compare exactly and fairly
is to be not elect ....
-Harold Bloom**
t Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, New York. This article, which cele-
brates the efforts of lone individuals, could not have been written without the assistance of many,
including Ellen Hertz, David Nied, Dan Ortiz and Nina Pillard. Special thanks are owed to Owen
Fiss, who first showed me that there is room for poetic greatness in the law by strongly misreading
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
* O.W. HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in CoLLEcTFD LEGAL PAPERS 29-30 (1920).
** H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE 19 (1973).
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INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court Justices are not often mistaken for poets. The duty of
the Justice is to resolve disputes,1 to implement and articulate fundamen-
tal values,' to interpret the Constitution,3 or to protect the democratic pro-
cess,4 depending on which legal scholar you read. The Supreme Court
construes and applies the law; penumbras notwithstanding, it does not
usually and is not expected to create ideas out of thin air. We value poets
for their creative breaks from the past; we ask judges to adhere to estab-
lished rules and principles.
Given this seemingly fundamental distinction between John Milton and
John Marshall, one might question the wisdom of applying a critical
model for reading poetry to Supreme Court adjudication. Indeed, the very
legitimacy of judicial review seems to rest on the difference. The rules of
precedent, central to Anglo-American notions of law, demand that Jus-
tices follow past authority and generally forbid the radically creative
breaks that we value in the poet. But the lines of distinction are not as
sharp as they first appear. Poets, too, are not free from historical influ-
ence; a creative act is always a break from a past tradition and is defined
and understood in terms of its relation to that tradition. Thus, even those
whom we identify as most creative are tied to the past.'
Just as a complete poetic break from tradition is impossible, so is slav-
ish adherence to judicial precedent unattainable. In order to follow prece-
dent, the Justice must first articulate its meaning. But the meaning of a
text is, if not absolutely indeterminate, always open to question. A socially
situated reader produces meaning in relation to a text; the text itself does
not provide meaning without that intervention. A particular precedent
may therefore appear to support several interpretations; the frequency of
split decisions demonstrates that, even within the constrained scope of le-
gal reasoning, at least two different readings are arguable.
In an age where the lines between poetry and literary interpretation are
increasingly deconstructed,6 and in a legal culture that has seen Legal
Realism evolve into Critical Legal Studies, it is not implausible to claim
that Supreme Court Justices are creative. At a minimum, the Justices are
creative insofar as the situations they face demand that a standing body of
law be consistently reinterpreted and tailored to novel facts. It may often
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
2. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
3. Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 UCLA L. REv. 467 (1967).
4. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
5. T.S. ELIOT, TRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL TALENT (1956).
6. V. NABOKOV, PALE FIRE (1962); G. HARTMAN, CRITICISM IN THE WILDERNESS (1980).
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be impossible simply to fit the facts before them into the puzzle of the
Constitution and case law; in landmark cases, it is clear, the Justices alter
the puzzle itself and create law. Thus, while judicial legitimacy requires
faithful adherence to precedent, legal development turns on creative acts.
As a result, we call judges who follow precedent legitimate, but those who
successfully break from it great.
This article argues that there is a fundamental tension in the law be-
tween legitimacy and greatness, and that this tension manifests itself not
only in Brown v. Board of Education,7 Lochner v. New York,' and Roe v.
Wade,9 but in all "strong" opinions. ° By focusing on these moments of
tension, the law, like poetry, can be read as an antithetical struggle for
meaning. These moments reveal that, as in poetry, those who ultimately
succeed in the struggle and are viewed as great are not those who follow
precedent, but those who break radically from tradition by acts of
"misreading.""1
In order to reveal the antithetical aspect of judicial character, this arti-
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. A "strong" opinion is one that is viewed by some relevant community-the community of
Supreme Court Justices, of academic commentators, or of the public-as influential. I will argue that
there are two necessary criteria for strength: (1) the opinion must be successful, in that it guides
subsequent legal development; and (2) the opinion must deviate from precedent. Thus, for an opinion
to be viewed as strong, and its author as great, it must deviate successfully from precedent.
This definition of strength, or greatness, appears to be non-normative; it requires only that the
Justice break from authority and eventually succeed in recapturing authority over the precedents di-
verged from. It might be argued, therefore, that under these criteria Justice Rehnquist would qualify
as a great Justice. Each criterion, however, may also contain an underlying normative component.
Thus, where a Justice breaks from the authority of past precedent merely to align himself with the
authority of state force, as in the Supreme Court's recent refusals to take jurisdiction over challenges
to state abuses of power, the decision is less a radical break than a switch of allegiances. In such a
case, where the Justice surrenders the authority of an independent judiciary to the authority of state
violence, the decision can hardly be called strong or great. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 56-60 (1983) (characterizing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 1660 (1983), as failures
of the Supreme Court to maintain independent normative authority).
The second criterion also has an implicit normative connotation. The measure of a misreader's
success in recapturing authority will turn on his or her acceptance in a number of distinct communi-
ties. None of these communities, it can be assumed, operates wholly without normative criteria. Some
communities may be less trustworthy than others in their capacity to render normative judgments at
any given moment, and therefore popularity should not be confused with greatness. In the end, how-
ever, the normative judgments of communities are all we have. If their approval and respect have no
normative significance, then the very idea of a normative criterion for greatness is meaningless.'
11. The term "misreading," as used here, is not meant to be disparaging; rather it defines a
necessary condition of interpretation. Harold Bloom, who gave the term its present meaning in liter-
ary criticism, argues that all reading and writing involves misreading, and that the crucial issue is the
extent or strength of the misreading. See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text. The term implies
that although most writers experience a need to appear not to misread, there is no such thing as a
"correct" reading. Contemporary philosophy of language supports this notion, insofar as it insists that
meaning results only from the interplay between the individual intentions of the author and reader, as
well as the social conventions of their respective languages and prejudices. Each reading will necessa-
rily be in some sense a new reading.
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cle will suggest an alternative method for reading cases and tracing legal
development. The traditional account-precedential incorpora-
tion-emphasizes the faithful application of precedent to novel situations
and leaves little or no room for the greatness that inheres in breaking
from precedent. This article will counterpose to the traditional account an
"antithetical model," drawn from a model for reading poetry devised by
literary critic Harold Bloom. The antithetical model focuses on misread-
ings, i.e., on the rhetorical mechanisms by which Justices manipulate and
refashion precedent in order to make their own mark. The model pro-
posed is antithetical in two senses: Internally, its machinery consists of
rhetorical struggle between Justices; externally, the model as a whole is
antithetical to the more traditional, and arguably incomplete, model of
precedential incorporation.
The idea of antithetical struggle, while sharply opposed to the rules of
precedent, does find support in the American legal tradition. The very
structure of the adjudicative process creates a forum for such struggle, and
as basic a legal doctrine as freedom of expression provides its philosophi-
cal justification. An alternative adjudicatory system might require consen-
sus or unanimity in judicial decisions; instead, our judicial structure pro-
vides room for judges to express their independent views in separate
concurring and dissenting opinions.12 A majority opinion bears preceden-
tial weight by definition, but dissents and concurrences may also prove
influential in the course of doctrinal development. The structure of Amer-
ican adjudication thus implies a belief in the possibilities of antithetical
struggle and encourages the interplay of such struggle with more straight-
forward precedential development.
The First Amendment suggests why we accord dissenting rhetoric such
an important place in legal decision-making. First Amendment theory is
founded upon the protection of minority rights; it is the dissenter, the per-
son who stands apart from the mainstream, who needs protection. The
First Amendment provides that protection because we believe that the
freedom to express one's views furthers both individual autonomy and the
12. It should be noted that in some civil and common law systems, each judge on the bench is
required to write an opinion. This practice was followed in the early opinions of the Supreme Court.
In such a system, the outcome of the particular case is determined solely by counting votes, and each
individual opinion holds no independent precedential authority. Such a system may well provide more
play for free-wheeling antithetical struggle, for each case provides the occasion for several misread-
ings, and no misreading is given the institutional authority that the majority wields in the contempo-
rary American system. The civil and common law systems thus appear especially suited to antithetical
analysis; such an analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this article. The complexities introduced by
the American system's institutionalization of the majority view, an innovation introduced by Justice
Marshall, are developed in Section II. On the early history of Supreme Court decisions, see ZoBell,
Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.
REV. 186 (1959).
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collective social welfare. The First Amendment therefore clears the field
for antithetical battle and affirms the place of such struggles in the self-
governance of the nation. 13
That we have created the conditions for rhetorical struggle in the struc-
ture of judicial decision-making and that we justify it in the doctrine of
free expression suggests that antithetical development may be more ac-
cepted, albeit tacitly, than the rules of precedent would indicate. By sug-
gesting a new method of reading judicial opinions, this article seeks to
highlight and reveal the rhetorical struggles that have always fueled juris-
prudential development.1 ' The analysis focuses more than traditional legal
scholarship on the use of linguistic conventions such as metaphor and
tone, and on the internal and intertextual commentary that these rhetori-
cal elements provide. Rhetorical analysis of a given text may reveal mis-
readings that, because of the law's express requirement of precedential
fidelity, cannot be acknowledged on the opinion's surface. Attention to the
repetition of particular metaphors may suggest how these rhetorical ele-
ments exert influence over time. Most importantly, because most of the
opinions discussed do not carry the authority of a majority holding, rhe-
torical persuasion is their primary channel of influence.
13. Justice Holmes himself celebrated this interconnection between legal development and First
Amendment values when he stated that "law embodies beliefs that have triumphed in the battle ofideas and then have translated themselves into action." 0. Holmes, Law and the Court, reprinted in0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 294-95 (1974). More recently, Justice Brennan remarked
that the function of judicial dissent "reflects the conviction that the best way to find the truth is to golooking for it in the marketplace of ideas. It is as if the opinions of the Court-both for the majority
and the dissent-were the product of a judicial town meeting." W. Brennan, In Defense of Dissent 4(Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture, Hastings College of Law, Nov. 18, 1985). Antithetical
struggle in a free speech dispute exemplifies precisely what First Amendment doctrine is designed toprotect: the interplay of the dissenter's voice and the majority's will. The doctrinal context of a FirstAmendment case may therefore inspire the Justice disposed to antithetical struggle, and may also add
subtle reflexive weight to the persuasive effect of dissenting rhetoric. First Amendment jurisprudence
therefore offers a fertile field for revealing the influence of rhetorical persuasion that operates in all
substantive areas of law.
14. The focus on the rhetoric of individual Justices is not meant to suggest that great Justices arethe only or even the primary instruments or initiators of legal change. Any comprehensive analysis of
the causes of legal change would require an examination of social forces beyond the scope of thisdiscussion. The persistent, organized demands of the labor movement, the rise and fall of the fear ofCommunism, the play of economic forces, and conceptions of the role of an activist federal government
all contributed significantly to the enhancements and restrictions of Supreme Court protection of
speech. See D. Kairys, Freedom of Speech, reprinted in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kalrys ed. 1982).Antithetical analysis is not intended to downplay these forces. To clalm that external conditions deter-
mine legal change does not exclude the possibility that individual Justices play a role in formulating
change in its distinctively legal form. Even if the Justice's only causal effect is limited to his or her
ability to foresee changes that will take hold in the future as a result of altered external conditions, theJustice's foresight will play a role in setting the doctrinal foundation for legal development. The lawis a set of rules described by language; at a minimum, Justices translate external conditions intolinguistic results. And translators, like interpreters, wield considerable power. This article's focus on
rhetoric stems not from a belief that rhetoric controls results in any exclusive manner, but from the
conviction that rhetoric both reflects and molds the social, psychological, and political struggles that
determine the development of legal doctrine.
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Part I of this article sets forth the fundamentals of Harold Bloom's
literary theory. Part II translates Bloom's interpretive model into the legal
context, demonstrates its congruence with theories of judicial dissent, and
concludes with a Freudian parable that suggests how the antithetical and
precedential models might interact.
Parts III and IV apply the antithetical model to selective fragments of
First Amendment legal history in order to demonstrate the place of rhe-
torical misreading in doctrinal development. Part III focuses on two of the
most significant opinions in the First Amendment tradition: a dissent by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Abrams v. United States,15 and a
concurrence by Justice Louis Brandeis in Whitney v. California."8 I will
suggest that both Holmes and Brandeis misread the same precur-
sor-Holmes himself, as he wrote in Schenck v. United States,'
7
Frohwerk v. United States,"8 and Debs v. United States. 9
Having considered two strong fathers of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the article follows a specific route on a historical "map of misread-
ing"20 in Part IV. The route culminates in the Court's granting federal
election candidates a limited right of affirmative access to the broadcast
media in CBS v. FCC." It features two strong misreadings by Justice
William Brennan, in which he establishes and extends the "marketplace
of ideas" metaphor, itself a misreading of Holmes' "free trade in ideas."
22
This section considers majority as well as dissenting opinions, and demon-
strates the simultaneous operation of mainstream precedential incorpora-
tion and an antithetical agonistic undercurrent in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
I. ANTITHETICAL CRITICISM-THE THEORY
The antithetical analysis that will follow finds its roots in a model for
reading poetry. This section will present a brief outline of that poetic
model in order to suggest links between the poet and the Justice. These
links are not meant to establish a one-to-one correspondence between the
two; rather, they provide the starting point for a critical enterprise that
will require careful comparison of the different institutional forces that
influence the poet and the Justice. This section focuses on Harold Bloom's
15. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
16. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
17. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
18. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
19. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
20. H. BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING (1975).
21. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
22. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); CBS v.
DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 170 (1973) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
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poetic model, but its purpose is not so much to explicate the specific
mechanics of Bloom's model as to suggest the model's utility for revealing
the struggle for influence in both poetic and legal texts.
Bloom's antithetical criticism, introduced in The Anxiety of Influence2 3
and revised and elaborated in several later works,2 ' attempts to explain
how individual poets respond to the poetic tradition and gain authority
within that tradition. This antithetical theory seeks to reveal certain moti-
vating forces behind literary creation, and to describe the ways by which
poets attain "greatness." The focus is at once individual and structural: it
accounts for the individual poet's greatness expressly in terms of his or her
relations to the community of past and present poets. And it posits a con-
flict at the center of the relationship, a conflict which necessitates struggle
and results in misreadings.
Bloom argues that creativity is necessarily revisionist. In his Freudian-
influenced terms, we are all belated sons to strong fathers (not, it seems,
daughters to strong mothers). 25 The poet, the artist, and the critic, in or-
der to be creative, must do battle with the influence of their precursors.
The field of battle for the poet and critic, as for the Justice, is the text.
Bloom argues that for a novice or "ephebe" to emerge a strong creator, he
must constructively misread his most important precursors. If he does not
misread them, the ephebe will be trapped in the anxiety of influence:
To be enslaved by any precursor's system . . . is to be inhibited
from creativity by an obsessive reasoning and comparing, presuma-
bly of one's own works to the precursor's. Poetic Influence is thus a
disease of self-consciousness ... 26
Bloom's "obsessive reasoning and comparing" echoes legal method; in-
deed, the requirements and conventions of legal practice seem to institu-
tionalize the anxiety of influence. This is the legal method of the average
23. H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973).
24. H. BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING (1975); H. BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VESSELS
(1982); H. BLOOM, AGON (1980); H. BLOOM, POETRY AND REPRESSION (1977).
25. By "belated" Bloom means that we cannot escape history. We are born with a past, and that
past shapes us as we seek to shape our present. Bloom draws explicitly on Freudian psychology to
explain the significance of our belatedness, and thus he speaks in terms of fathers and sons. Bloom
makes little or no attempt to counteract the male-centered bias of Freud's theories, and he has been
criticized for this. See Kolodny, A Map of Rereading: Or, Gender and the Interpretation of Literary
Texts, 11 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 451 (1980); C. Greenberg, Reading, Reading: Echo's Abduction
of Language, reprinted in WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN LrrERATURE AND SOCIETY 300 (McConnell-
Ginet et. al., eds. 1980); S. GILBERT & S. GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE ATTIC: THE WOMAN
WRITER AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY IMAGINATION (1979). A feminist critique of
Blomian criticism, however, is beyond the scope of this article. Although I agree with feminist critics
that Bloom's model is deficient as an exclusive account for creativity, I also believe that it offers a
useful method for understanding the influence of the past.
26. H. BLOOM, supra note 23, at 29.
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lawyer, judge, and Justice, but it is not the method of the poetic genius,
nor, I will argue, of the great Justice.
Bloom's interpretive model assumes an intertextual vantage point.
"[Tihe meaning of a poem can only be another poem," Bloom claims, and
"[ciriticism is the art of knowing the hidden roads that go from poem to
poem."' 27 Bloomian criticism constructs a map of misreading, focusing on
the anxiety of influence that ties one great poet to another and on the
"revisionary ratios""8 that can free them. The antithetical critic is con-
cerned with the rhetorical relationship between great poems, for these re-
lationships are crucial to understanding the act of creation. Bloom thus
regards the investigation of a single poem or poet as fundamentally mis-
guided. Because all poets are "belated," their poems can only be under-
stood in relation to their precursors' poems.
Bloom's critical enterprise is based on Freud's family romance, specifi-
cally, on the father-son aspect of the Oedipal conflict. Bloom extends the
Oedipal conflict beyond the immediate family to suggest that strong poets
are creator-fathers to ephebes. The precursors create the traditions within
which the belated would-be creators are educated and in which they find
themselves firmly planted. In Bloom's theory, Oedipus' patricide becomes
a metaphor for denying or overcoming the precursor's influence. At the
same time, that influence is to some extent inescapable. Bloom's "revision-
ary ratios," the textual manifestations of the poet's struggle with the anxi-
ety of influence, are analogous to Freud's defense mechanisms of the
ego.2 Just as defense mechanisms repress but cannot destroy unpleasant
ideas and affects to allow us to function, so revisionary ratios free the
subject for constructive creative action, but cannot destroy or wholly insu-
late the subject from the effects of the precursors.
The great poets, in Bloom's model, use a variety of revisionary ratios to
escape the anxiety of influence. Revisionary ratios describe the possible
relationships between a poet and his precursors as a series of increasingly
radical misreadings. At one extreme, the young poet merely swerves from
the line established by his or her precursor; the new text appears as a
gentle corrective movement, developing the idea of the precursor along a
slightly different line.30 At the other extreme, the ephebe's misreading is
so strong that the precursor's work is viewed thereafter only as an elabo-
27. Id. at 95-96.
28. The "revisionary ratios" set out below in the text are drawn primarily from THE ANXIETY
OF INFLUENCE. See also W. HUBBARD, COMPLICITY AND CONVICTION: STEPS TOWARD AN ARCHI-
TECTURE OF CONVENTION (1980) (applying Bloom's ratios to law and architecture).
29. See H. BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING, supra note 24, at 89, 95-101.
30. Bloom labels this revisionary ratio "clinamen." In a similarly gentle misreading, which Bloom
calls "tessera," the young poet extends the precursor's line by developing its implications and complet-
ing its logic.
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ration on it. The new poet recaptures priority over his precursor, so that
the precursor's poetry now reads as if it were always already indebted to
the new poet's work. The later text so strongly reveals the essence of the
prior work that the precursor seems to have imitated the ephebe; the son
becomes father to the father.
The revisionary ratios suggest parallels between the poetic and legal
functions. The gentle corrective movement appears to describe the type of
development contemplated by precedential incorporation; the more ex-
treme revision describes the moment of victory in the antithetical struggle,
precedent overruled. Two methods of misreading which fall between these
extremes also have special relevance to the legal model. In one revisionary
scheme, the outline or form of the precursor's text is retained, but its core
is filled with new meaning. In the legal realm, this mechanism allows a
Justice to maintain the appearance of following precedent while subtly
altering the meaning of that precedent. A second revisionary method con-
sists of generalizing the specific strength of the precursor by absorbing it
into the unfocused principles of tradition; the poet is thus able to present,
as his own contribution, a clearer, more precise version of the precursor's
approach. Both the initial generalization and the belated specification of-
fer vast opportunities for misreading. In the legal context, the artfully ex-
ploited string cite is an especially effective mechanism for this type of
misreading."'
Bloom's revisionary ratios need not be limited to poetic relations. The
anxiety of influence afflicts all writers who seek to assert a voice or iden-
tity. Any act of interpretation, moreover, requires the articulation of a
point of view belonging to the individual reader. Bloom's model implies
that all points of view are in some sense revisionary and that those indi-
viduals whom we consider "great," "strong," or "influential" are those
whose views stand out as most revisionary.
Thus, Bloom's model applies to critics as well as to poets. Critics stand
in relation to precursor critics just as poets stand in relation to their pre-
cursors. The relation between critic and poet is more complicated, but
here, too, the critic may feel the fires of agon as he or she seeks to present
a new reading of a great poem, one which, if strong, will forever alter the
meaning of that poem for future readers.
Justices may be closer to critics than to poets. Like critics, their func-
tion is to read texts in a public and definitive way. They interpret the
original text of the Constitution and the legislature's laws, and cannot
make the poet's assertion of priority. The Justice, like the critic, offers a
reading whose authority must rest in part on its apparent fidelity to an
31. For examples of such string cites, see text accompanying notes 170-74, 184-88.
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original text. Nevertheless, the Justices are sometimes strong, creative
misreaders of the prior texts, and their strength can reroute the path of
precedent, change the meaning of the Constitution or federal law, and
become a new source of anxiety for their descendants. Strong creativity
signals greatness, whether it be in a poet, a critic, or a judge. And, in
Bloom's theory, all creativity presupposes an anxiety of influence; the cre-
ator must overcome his lack of priority. While the critic and Justice may
not be able to do this quite as completely or overtly as the poet, their
motivations and anxieties differ only in degree, not in kind. Just as the
great critics are those who have introduced new ways of reading, turned
traditional criticism on its head, and altered our-perceptions of original
texts, so the great Justices-here, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis
Brandeis, and William Brennan-are those who have introduced and cre-
ated new analyses, new approaches, and, in the process, new law.
II. THE THEORY TRANSLATED-INSTITUTIONAL ANXIETY AND THE
RULE OF LAW
A. Institutionalized Anxieties
Although the creative and interpretive functions of poets, critics, and
Justices coincide with respect to their relations to past authority, their
respective social roles differ sharply. Society's definition of, and expecta-
tions for, the Justice simultaneously reinforce, mitigate, and complicate
the anxiety of influence. Our highly structured legal system institutional-
izes the demands that past authority makes on all readers and writers.
The Justice's anxiety of influence is assuaged insofar as legitimacy rests
on following precedent, but it is exacerbated to the extent that greatness
lies in breaking from precedent.
If legitimacy is all a Justice seeks, he or she may be comforted by the
rule of law. Precedent, stare decisis, and notions of a restrained judiciary
all explicitly constrain the Justice's creative role. As long as the Justice
remains safely within these bounds, his or her decisions are generally read
as legitimate, though not necessarily strong. Unlike the poet, whose very
authority turns on priority, the Justice finds legitimacy in a kind of plod-
ding belatedness.
For a poet, "to be judicious is to be weak, and to compare exactly and
fairly is to be not elect."'3 2 But for the Justice, to appear to compare ex-
actly and fairly is necessary. The judge's legitimacy rests on the rule of
law, which in turn requires public, accountable, and predictable decision-
making. Law is designed to impose order on the vicissitudes of social coex-
32. H. BLOOM, supra note 23, at 19.
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istence. A legal order that was subject only to the whim and caprice of a
few men in black robes who considered themselves divinely inspired
would be little more than despotism; its legitimacy would likely rest on
the threat of physical force rather than on the consent of the people. The
requirement that law in a democratic society be ordered, principled, and
predictable places explicit burdens on the Justice that the poet, or even
the critic, does not bear. The typical Justice's anxiety thus more likely
arises from a break with precedent than from adherence to the influence
of precursors. While the anxiety of influence suggests that the poet can
never break completely from his past, precedent demands that a jurist
never do so.
For the jurist, then, the anxiety that Bloom identifies may be moderated
by the law's sanctification of belatedness. The victors at Agon necessarily
produce anxieties of influence for their descendants, but incorporation
through precedent legitimizes that inevitable influence and reduces the
anxiety. The demands of social stability and legal predictability turn the
anxiety of influence on its head; where the poet suffers anxiety at the
prospect that he or she will not escape from the precursor's shadow, thejudge's immediate anxiety arises from the threat that his or her rulings
will not be accepted unless they appear consistent with precedent. The
poet's job is to break from the past; the judge's duty is to conform to the
past.
But as much as we value order and predictability in the law, we also
celebrate those judges whose strong, creative visions eventually capture the
allegiance of the legal and social culture. A judge who commands a major-
ity by adopting an interpretation that covers no new ground will probably
not be remembered as great; to be great, a judge must both break from
precedent and ultimately succeed in having his or her views accepted. 33
As noted above, the structure of judicial decision-making provides a
33. This does not claim to be an exclusive definition of greatness. A Justice may also be viewed as
great for her or his ability to forge majorities, that is, to provide political rather than rhetorical leader-
ship. Justice Warren, for example, would probably fit the "political" model of greatness more readily
than the individualistic, rhetorical one emphasized in this article. Yet even that type of greatness
requires a break from precedent and an ability to command a following; bowing to authority simply
does not fit under any definition of "greatness."
The breaks accomplished by the politically great Justice may be slightly more masked, and will
almost certainly be less extreme, than those available to the lone dissenter who does not need to
compromise, but they may prove at least as influential in the long run. Antithetical analysis thus need
not look only to individual Justices; a focus on misreadings could be just as fruitfully applied to
majority opinions that appear to lay new ground and break from past precedent. What antithetical
criticism seeks to reveal in any opinion is the conflict between legitimacy and greatness, between the
need to follow authority and the desire to exercise independent authority. But antithetical analysis
does insist that more careful attention should be paid to the dissents and concurrences of individual
Justices than is traditionally paid under precedential analysis. It does not claim that the separate
opinion is the sole arena for greatness, but only that it is a much more important arena than tradi-
tional accounts have recognized.
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channel for such greatness, and the principle of free speech expressly rec-
ognizes its social value. Thus, while we refrain from giving the full weight
of institutional authority to the voice of a lone Justice, we ensure that his
or her voice may be heard, thereby allowing room for the great individual
to exert rhetorical pressure on the development of legal doctrine.
For the strong misreader, then, precedent may prove not a comfort but
a bane; it superimposes on the anxiety of influence the anxiety of breaking
from that influence. Because the poet's authority rests explicitly on origi-
nality, the poet may seek to evade the inescapable influence of his or her
precursors by an overt misreading. The Justice, however, must both mis-
read, in order to make space for his or her contribution, and appear not to
misread, in order to draw on the authority of precedent." The rules of
precedent thus confine and complicate the reactive mode of the family ro-
mance; one must sanctify one's father at the very moment that one kills
him. Subtlety and duplicity are called for, as past precedents are offered
up, praised, and misread.
In some respects, the law's fundamental requirement of fidelity to past
authority renders legal opinions more susceptible to antithetical analysis
than poetry. Agonistic undercurrents may run closer to the surface in the
legal opinion, insofar as precedential authority must be cited and ex-
pressly relied upon. Even where the contours of a misreading are defined
by what is not cited, the citation requirement (as well as the threat that a
separate opinion may point out missing authorities) makes it more diffi-
cult to obscure the influence of a strong precursor.
The explicit requirements of legal reasoning may also bring to the sur-
face the ambivalence felt by a great Justice faced with a strong precursor.
The language of the law underscores the extent to which tradition con-
strains the Justice, while history demonstrates the amount of play in the
constraints. Thus, it is a rare Justice who will not insist that precedent
compels his or her decision, even when it is evident that the result advo-
cated marks a significant revision of prior authority. The tension between
proffering a new vision and following the precedential line, between
greatness and legitimacy, is distilled at the point where the Justice,
through a misreading, simultaneously revises the law and insists that he
34. Even this distinction is only one of degree. The poet may also face the double bind of misread-
ing and appearing not to misread. While originality in poetry is explicitly valued and encouraged,
tradition necessarily defines the standards for a strong and effective poetic voice. Readers and critics
can only understand and evalute a new poem in terms that are heavily influenced by prevailing
standards. The poet who deviates too sharply, therefore, may be dismissed as misguided rather than
celebrated as creative. Thus, both the poet and the Justice must walk a fine line. The difference in
their respective misreadings may ultimately reduce to one of emphasis-while the great poet seeks to
underscore what is new within a medium that necessarily derives much of its value from what is old
and established, the great Justice strives to demonstrate fidelity to the established precedential order in
what amounts to a new vision.
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or she is doing nothing more than applying the law. Antithetical analysis
focuses on these moments of tension.
As noted above, the more traditional and explicit paradigm for judicial
progress is the precedential model. In this developmental scheme, precur-
sors provide the groundwork or foundation for later additions. The revi-
sionary movement is at once friendlier and more rational; the ephebe in-
corporates various positive elements of her or his past into a more
complete whole, a closer approximation to the Truth, the Good, or the
Just. Complexity builds by increments on simple foundations, as each
generation adds its discoveries to the ever-increasing fount of knowledge.
This positivist notion of accumulation provides the explicit underpinnings
for the doctrine of precedent. Truth or justice is approached through or-
dered, reasoned dialogue; precedent provides stability not only for the
public but also for judges.
The antithetical model fills out and complicates the conventional story.
It claims that even as precedential development goes on, an undercurrent
of agonistic struggle surges, surfacing in the strong opinions of great Jus-
tices. It suggests, moreover, that while the Court's legitimacy rests on the
promise of organic development, our notions of greatness in a Justice are
defined by something other than precedential fidelity. The traditional ap-
proach to reading cases emphasizes the organic surface; the reading sug-
gested in this article will search for the equally crucial, often more power-
ful undertows.
B. Misreading and the Function of Dissent
Every judicial opinion misreads past precedent. No judge or group of
judges can state unequivocally and without distortion the holding of a
prior case or the precise rule to be applied in the case at hand. To find
and apply a rule of law requires interpretation of past precedent, and the
act of interpretation necessarily involves some degree of misreading. Anti-
thetical criticism therefore should be applicable to all opin-
ions-unanimous, majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting.
Dissents are nonetheless an especially appropriate focus for antithetical
analysis. The agonistic struggle by definition involves a certain element of
isolation, because insofar as we are defined and determined by our prede-
cessor's influence, we must, as part of the creative moment, separate our
sense of identity from the past that constitutes our present. Breaking from
the tradition, we find ourselves alone. This suggests that while both the
majority and the dissent will misread precedent, the dissent will often pre-
sent the more extreme misreading. In dissent, the Justice stands apart;
similarly, in concurrence his theory will be his own, even while he agrees
with the result.
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It is possible, but less likely, that a majority opinion will advance a
more radical misreading than a dissent, or even that a unanimous opinion,
when viewed against its precedential background, will constitute a strong
misreading. Collective misreadings do occur-the American Revolution,
the Constitution, and several of the Amendments constitute strong collec-
tive misreadings on a grand scale-but they are much more difficult and
consequently much less frequent.3 5 To be valued as great, one must stand
out; while collective bodies do at times stand out as great, both the re-
quirement of a radical break and the inherent exclusivity of the term sug-
gest that "greatness" will be found more often in an individual than in a
committee. If the antithetical theory holds, then, revisions in the law will
often surface initially in dissenting or concurring opinions, and only later,
if they are truly strong, will they be incorporated into the mainstream.
3 6
This view of the special affinity between dissents and agonistic struggle
is reflected in the academic and popular literature on dissents, as well as
in the words of the Justices themselves.37 Many writers have drawn a
connection between the choice to dissent and the expression of a strong
individual voice addressed to the future. Those critical of dissent have at-
tributed the choice to dissent to an "inflation of the judicial ego,"' 38 and
have called for the appointment of Justices with more "assenting
minds."39 Those who value the role of dissent, most notably the Justices
themselves, cast the same connection in a different light. Thus, Justice
Charles Evans Hughes insisted that the "dissenting opinion enables a
judge to express his individuality," 40 and described the dissent as "an ap-
peal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day,
when a later decision may possibly correct the error."41 Justice Douglas
35. For an example of a collective misreading, see the discussion of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (incorporating Holmes' clear and present
danger test); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (incorporating Harlan's dissenting ap-
proach in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896)); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (incorporating Brandeis' principle of self-government as First Amendment foundation).
An extraordinary number of Justice Holmes' dissents eventually became majority law. See ZoBell,
Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q.
186, 202 n.92 (1959). Dissents in Chisholm v. Georgia, Scott v. Sanford and Pollack v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. "influenced the passage of the llth, 14th and 16th amendments to the U.S.
Constitution respectively." Recent Decisions, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 438, 451 n.9 (1955).
37. In much of the following material on judicial and academic attitutes toward dissent I have
drawn upon Susan Russ' incisive survey of the literature on dissent. S. Russ, Dissenting Opinions
(1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
38. The Trouble with the Warren Court, LIFE, June 16, 1958, at 35, quoted in ZoBell, supra
note 36, at 186; see also Hirt, In the Matter of Dissents Inter Judices deJure, 31 PA. B.A.Q. 256,
258-59 (1960).
39. James, 9 A.B.A. J. 398 (1923).
40. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
41. Id.; see also B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LrrERATURE 35-36 (1931) ("[T]he dissenter speaks to
the future, and his voice is pitched in a key that will carry through the years.").
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put it more bluntly: "The right to dissent is the only thing that makes life
tolerable for the judge of an appellate court . . . It is the right of dis-
sent, not the right or duty to conform, which gives dignity, worth and
individuality to man."'42
Others have celebrated the role of dissent in fostering growth, flexibility
and change in the law,43 and have noted the parallels between the formal
judicial mechanism of dissent and the broader function of dissent in First
Amendment theory.4' Cardozo himself linked dissent with strong rhetoric,
explaining that the dissenter is called upon to speak with "an elevation of
mood and thought and phrase," and that "[w]e need not be surprised,
therefore, to find in dissent a certain looseness of texture and depth of
color rarely found in the [majority].'4 5
More recently, Justice Brennan defended the practice of dissent, stating
that the most important dissents are those "that seek to sow seeds for
future harvest."46 In Justice Brennan's words, "[tihese are the dissents
that soar with passion and ring with rhetoric. These are the dissents that,
at their best, straddle the worlds of literature and law.' 7 In some cases,
Brennan noted, these great dissents "ripen into majority opinions."'48
Antithetical analysis takes seriously these justifications for and explana-
tions of dissent and seeks to demonstrate how the strong dissenter both
does battle with the past and affects the future. Antithetical criticism pro-
vides a method for analyzing dissent which itself constitutes a dissent from
more traditional legal analysis. And like the best dissents, the antithetical
model "straddle[s] the worlds of literature and law," applying the former's
critical methods to the latter's texts in order to gain a more complete un-
derstanding of legal development.
42. W. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4-5 (1960).
43. S. Russ, supra note 37, at 36-40.
44. Rathjen, Time and Dissension on the United States Supreme Court, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
227, 235 (1980). See also supra note 13.
45. B. CARDOZO, supra note 41, at 35-36.
46. W. Brennan, In Defense of Dissent 5, (Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture, Hastings
College of Law, Nov. 18, 1985).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 11. Brennan cites as examples of such dissents Justice Stone's dissent in Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (refusal for religious reasons to salute flag), adopted
in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Burnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), adopted in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483(1954); Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919); and Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). He also cited some great
dissents that have not yet ripened, such as Justice Jackson's in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.214, 242 (1944). But c. Hohri v. U.S., 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (suit by Japanese-American
World War II internees against United States seeking money damages and declaratory judgment).
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C. A Freudian Parable
It seems only just that we return. to Freud, the precedent for Bloom's
misreading, to complete the picture presented by antithetical legal analy-
sis. The institutional dynamic defined by the juxtaposition of the rule of
law and the drive to dissent is, as we have seen, the force behind misread-
ing. In its broadest sense, it involves a precarious balance between soci-
ety's need for stability and order and its simultaneous need to promote
change and to facilitate individual innovation and greatness. This societal
and individual ambivalence was a central concern of much of Freud's
work, most notably Civilization and its Discontents.49 Its particular rela-
tion to the the interplay of precedent and agonistic dissent in the law can
be represented metaphorically by Freud's myth of the primal horde, from
Totem and Taboo.50
Freud posits a Darwinian patriarchal horde, ruled by a "violent and
jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away his
sons as they grow up."5" The horde comes to a dramatic, macabre end
when "[o]ne day the brothers who had been driven out came together,
killed and devoured their father .... -52 United (in what might be
viewed as the first collective misreading), the brothers find the strength to
commit the crime that individually none could achieve. The brothers,
Freud explains, hold deeply ambivalent feelings for their tyrannical fa-
ther. They fear, hate, and envy him, but "they love[] and admire[] him
too."53 In devouring their father, they identify with him, and "acquire[] a
portion of his strength."' 4 Once their hatred and desire for power are
temporarily satisfied, the brothers' repressed filial affection for the father
returns in a remorseful sense of guilt. They assuage this guilt by "de-
ferred obedience" to the dead father's strictures, and the "dead father [be-
comes] stronger than the living one had been . . . . 55 From this deferred
obedience Freud derives primitive society's first two laws, which he refers
to as the fundamental taboos of totemism: the prohibitions against incest
and against the killing of the totem animal (a father-surrogate). Both
prohibitions recapitulate the father's wishes in social mores.
The brothers continue to resent their father's influence, however, and
49. S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND rrs DIscONTENTs (J. Strachey trans. 1961).
50. S. FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO 141-59 (1913), reprinted by W.W. Norton & Co. (1950).
Although Freud apparently presents the primal horde story as an actual historical account of the birth
of society as we know it, I offer it only as a parable. It should not be read to advance a psychological
foundation for the legal development I will discuss herein, but merely as an evocation of the dynamics
of the interplay between agon and precedent.
51. Id. at 141.
52. Id. (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 143.
54. Id. at 142.
55. Id. at 143.
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periodically the resentment surfaces: they replay the original murder
through a ritualistic killing and eating of the totem animal. The brothers'
ambivalence toward the father continues unabated, Freud argues, both
collectively-in society, morality, and religion-and individually, in the
form of the internalized father, or the super-ego. Freud's account specifi-
cally traces the development of religion out of totemism, but the myth
offers an equally provocative evocation of the dynamics of legal
development.
The two models of legal progress discussed above-antithetical struggle
and cumulative incorporation-can be viewed as the dual strains of am-
bivalent feelings for the father that Freud identified. The rule of prece-
dent, like the totemic system's covenant between the brothers, promises
"snot to repeat the deed which had brought destruction on their real fa-
ther."5 Just as "totemism helped to smooth things over and to make it
possible to forget the event to which it owed its origin,' '57 so cumulative
incorporation, manifested explicitly in the doctrine of precedent, may be
represented as a societal response designed to smooth over and render ac-
ceptable past breaks from authority. Freud cites as contemporary evidence
of this totemic covenant the following neurotic behavior: "We find it oper-
ating in an asocial manner in neurotics, and producing new moral
precepts and persistent restrictions, as an atonement for crimes that have
been committed and as a precaution against the committing of new
ones." '58 The conduct of Freud's neurotic, like that of Bloom's weak poet,
sounds suspiciously like conventional law-making. Like the neurotic, the
legal order spins out increasingly complex restrictions and rules to cover
over and atone for radical breaks, be they criminal, revolutionary, or
creative.
Cumulative incorporation, represented in Freud's parable by the affec-
tionate, guilt-ridden obedience of the sons to their dead father's strictures,
and in Bloom's scheme by the inevitability of influence, is counterposed by
an agonistic struggle for independence. Freud's notion of fundamental am-
bivalence insists on the eternal coexistence of both the affectionate and
hostile impulses, just as Bloom's model emphasizes the poet's continuous
effort to escape the anxiety of influence through misreading. "The tension
of ambivalence was evidently too great for any contrivance to be able to
counteract it."59 The hostile drive to agonistic struggle remains despite the
socially necessary cumulative incorporation. Thus, Freud finds in the cele-
bration of the totem meal
56. Id. at 144.
57. Id. at 145.
58. Id. at 159 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 145.
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a duty to repeat the crime of parricide again and again in the sacri-
fice of the totem animal, whenever, as a result of the changing condi-
tions of life, the cherished fruit of the crime-appropriation of the
paternal attributes-threatened to disappear.60
For Bloom's poet, the "fruit of the crime" is the freedom to create. For
the Justice, the fruit of the crime is, ironically, the ability to break from
precedent and to create new law-in Freud's terms, to appropriate the
attributes of the father. Under the strict rules of precedent, "misreading"
is just short of criminal, but in the metaphorical terms of agon, it is the
method of greatness. Thus, the very word "misreading" crystallizes the
ambivalence between legitimacy and greatness that inheres in the exercise
of legal authority.
Freud's account of totemic development, like Bloom's approach to po-
etic influence, seeks to explain certain dynamic consequences stemming
from the individual's existence in society. In Freud's parable, society's
need for adherence to order is balanced ambivalently against the individ-
ual's desire to exert autonomous authority. In Bloom's more narrow
scheme, the influence of precursor poets is set against the individual poet's
attempt to develop an independent voice. Both theories envision a con-
flicted and necessary interplay between individual initiative and social
cohesion.61
Translation of these accounts to the legal paradigm reveals an adjudica-
tive structure that similarly seeks to accommodate social consensus and
individual initiative. The structure of judicial decisions grants institutional
authority to the will of the Court majority, and extends this authority over
time through the rule of precedent. At the same time, the structure leaves
room for individual initiative in the separate opinion, whose authority is
limited to the force of persuasion and rhetoric. Institutional authority rests
with the majority, but room for greatness remains in the rhetorical space
left to the individual Justice. Traditional legal scholarship emphasizes the
former; antithetical analysis insists on the latter, and calls for an approach
that comprehends the dialectic of their interaction over time.
6 2
60. Id.
61. A similar dynamic between individual autonomy and social cohesion is described in critical
legal studies terms as the "fundamental contradiction." Duncan Kennedy describes it as follows:
"Most participants in American legal culture believe that the goal of individual freedom is at the same
time dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve
it." Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 211 (1975).
62. Misreading should be viewed primarily as a process that takes place over time, i.e., diachroni-
cally. Because the structure of a legal decision requires Justices to offer simultaneously their various
misreadings of the relevant precedent, some signs of diachronic misreading may be manifested in a
synchronic dimension, for example, in the dissent's misreading of the majority. To the extent that the
majority reflects a less radical misreading of the precursor, the dissent may do battle with the precur-
sor in part through the medium of the majority. Thus, a dissenter's synchronic battle with the major-
Vol. 95: 857, 1986
Agon at Agora
The interaction of agon and precedent appears to be contemplated not
only by our judicial structure, but by the human condition. Thus, Freud
implies that the root significance of ambivalence in every individual fore-
closes its eradication by, and necessitates its incorporation in, such social
constructs as judicial review. Bloom insists that the human need for crea-
tivity drives us all to agon. I will suggest that the Justice is not spared.
III. THE THEORY APPLIED-ORIGINAL MISREADINGS
A. Philosophical Origins-Milton, Locke, and Mill
There are no self-evident origins. Beginning any antithetical reading is
necessarily an arbitrary act; the contingency of belatedness pervades the
history of humankind. This does not mean, however, that in our quest for
a starting place we are reduced to throwing darts at a wall of Supreme
Court Reporters. The arbitrary nature of pinpointing an origin need not
force us down the slippery slope to nihilism. Rather, the place to begin is
with a recognized "strong" opinion; such an opinion, the antithetical
model suggests, will simultaneously misread and redefine its origins, while
becoming, in the process, an origin.
The Court in Dennis v. United States63 gives us an idea of where to
begin: "No important case involving free speech was decided by this Court
prior to Schenck v. United States."" In Schenck, Justice Holmes, writing
for a unanimous Court in 1919, introduced the "clear and present dan-
ger" test; but it was not until his dissent in Abrams v. United States65
eight months later that this test was given the meaning it was to carry for
several formative decades in First Amendment jurisprudence. With these
Espionage Act cases, freedom of speech began to take its peculiarly Amer-
ican shape.
But the First Amendment was not written in 1919. For 122 years prior
to Schenck, the clause beginning "Congress shall make no law. . ." stood
on the books."6 The extent to which the First Amendment marked, at the
time of its passage, a strong revision of prior theories of freedom of speech
is much disputed.67 That it was not written on a clean slate, however, is
ity may be a sign of his diachronic struggle with the precursor.
63. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
64. Id. at 503.
65. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
66. The First Amendment itself, as well as the rest of the Bill of Rights, marked a strong collec-
tive revision of the Constitution. The ratification debates revealed that the original document did not
provide sufficient safeguards for individual and state rights. While Madison felt that the underlying
philosophy of the sovereignty of the people and the enumerated powers of their government precluded
any need for a Bill of Rights, the people apparently disagreed, and the first ten amendments were
added in 1791.
67. The traditional view, attributable to Professor Zachariah Chafee, Jr., holds that the First
Amendment abolished the common law of seditious libel, thereby strongly revising the Blackstonian
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clear. As Justice Holmes remarked in a related context: "[T]he provisions
of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in
their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English
soil." s6 8 Even the American Revolution, as complete a "revision" as this
country has known, did not wipe out the influence of our English past. In
its broadest outlines, the American system was defined against the Parlia-
mentary system, and in its particulars much was carried over more or less
intact.69
Any examination of the First Amendment, then, requires a preliminary
overview of the British tradition. Milton's Areopagitica, an early tract on
the liberty of thought and expression which is often cited, quoted, and
misquoted by First Amendment scholars and Justices, bases freedom of
expression on the search for Truth: "Truth is compar'd in Scripture to a
streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetuall progression,
they sick'n into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition.170 Milton was
convinced that pluralism and free discussion, within limits, would lead to
the discovery of Truth; in this he foreshadowed Holmes' concept of free
trade in ideas. 71 Milton's primary concern was for Truth itself, more than
for the individuals who might lead humankind to it. For Milton, Truth
was a transcendent ideal toward which all good men should strive. 2 In
man's search for Truth, error and vice should be tolerated, but only be-
cause fallen men can know good only by contrast with evil.73
Despite the strong rhetoric of Milton's pleas, he was unwilling to ex-
tend protection for speech to all speakers or ideas. His Truth bears a
capital "T," and he was certain that "popery" (Catholicism), "open su-
perstition," and all that "which is impious or evil absolutely either against
conception of free expression, which limited the protection of speech to the prohibition of prior re-
straints. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 9-30 (1948); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952)
(Black, J., dissenting); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964).
Recent scholars offer a revisionist reading, which asserts that the First Amendment was a weak
misreading, if a misreading at all, of the Blackstonian conception, and was intended to leave the law
of seditious libel in place. See L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
68. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
69. See generally G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
70. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM 22 (M.
Mayer ed. 1957).
71. Compare Milton, supra note 70, at 28 ("Let [Truth] and Falshood grapple; who ever knew
Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encounter.") with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. at 630
("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market"). Compare Milton, supra note 70, at 20 ("Truth and understanding are not such wares as to
be monopoliz'd and traded in by tickets and statutes, and standards") with Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) ("Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or potatoes.")
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. Milton, supra note 70.
73. Id.
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faith or maners" had no place in the "streaming fountain."'74 Late in his
life, Milton suggested that discussion of certain important issues be con-
ducted in Latin, "which the common people understand not."7" In 1651,
Milton was himself a censor for Cromwell's regime.7 6 Milton's impas-
sioned pleas for liberty of expression must therefore be read in light of his
religious and intellectual elitism; in hindsight, his rhetoric appears to have
overstepped his theory and practice.1 7 The rhetoric, however, lives on as
an important foundation for free speech theory, even while its basis, the
belief in an objective, divine Truth, has in many realms collapsed.
The collapse was hardly imminent. John Locke followed Milton in ar-
guing for freedom of expression on grounds of the pursuit of objective
truth, though he swerved from Milton's shadow by emphasizing the igno-
rance of all men. Where Milton envisioned cloistered Protestants discuss-
ing Veritas in Latin, Locke insisted that "[w]e should do well to commis-
erate our mutual ignorance."'7' Locke questioned man's ability to know
the truth at all: "For where is the man that has incontestable evidence
of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of all he con-
demns . . . ?,,71 In Locke's view, man had fallen further than Milton
would admit. Locke's misreading approaches a recognition of absolute in-
dividual uncertainty, but for him, truth still stood apart, above, to be
striven for: "let truth have fair play in the world . men the liberty to
search after it." 80
John Stuart Mill, too, seemed to believe in an objective, transcendent
standard of truth. In On Liberty, he offered three arguments against the
suppression of speech, all ultimately based on the objectivity of truth: (1)
the suppressed opinion may be true; (2) the suppressed opinion may bear
a portion of the truth, and only through conflict with other partially true
doctrines will the full truth be known; and (3) falsehood serves, by opposi-
tion, to ensure that living truth will not be reduced to stale dogma. l
Mill's distinctive contribution was his insistence that freedom of expres-
sion has an individual as well as social value. He emphasized the impor-
tance of free speech in developing the rational and intellectual capabilities
74. Id. at 22, 29.
75. Milton, Of True Religion, Heresie, Schism, and Toleration (1673), quoted in L. LEVY,
supra note 67, at 97.
76. L. LEVY, supra note 67, at 97.
77. Alternatively, one might argue that Milton's rhetoric, as misread by those who have since
cited him to support more inclusive theories of free speech, has been extended beyond Milton's
intentions.
78. Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," reprinted in MAYER, supra note 70,
at 285.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 283.
81. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 38 (lst ed. 1859) (McCallum ed. 1949).
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of autonomous persons, in addition to its role in society's search for truth.
Individual autonomy and the discovery of truth thus provided a dual foun-
dation for Mill's free speech arguments.
By 1859, the English soil was rich with the rhetoric and theory of free
speech. Though the search for a transcendent truth remained a constant
theme, the revisions of Locke and Mill had lessened its significance.
Locke, by insisting on man's ignorance, implicitly questioned the possibil-
ity of attaining truth. Mill's misreading shifted the focus to the individual,
however ignorant, and argued that the silencing of speech would only
make people more ignorant still.82 Mill, moreover, expressed some doubts
about the model of the organic superaddition of knowledge,83 and in this
he may have marked the beginning of a shift in free speech theory, from a
concern for attaining objective truth to advancing individual autonomy.
It would be a long time before the United States courts developed the
implications of Mill's revisions. Protection of speech was almost nonexis-
tent in the first 122 years of adjudication surrounding the First Amend-
ment.8 Where the Supreme Court addressed free speech claims at all, it
consistently denied them. The Court applied the "bad tendency" test to
reject a number of claims;85 refused to incorporate the First Amendment
into the Fourteenth, thereby leaving the states free from its proscrip-
tions;86 and asserted that the First Amendment was limited to Blackstone's
view that free speech required only a prohibition on prior restraints.87
There were, moreover, widespread restrictions on speech that never
reached the Supreme Court: the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798; mob and
state tyranny during the abolitionist era; the suspension of habeas corpus
during the Civil War; and the unrelenting suppression of blacks in the
South and of workers and aliens in the cities. Legal scholarship in the
pre-World War I era argued eloquently for greater protection of First
Amendment rights, but the legal reality still belonged to Blackstone.8"
82. Id. at 30.
83. "Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes, one partial and
incomplete truth for another. . . ." Id. at 40.
84. For an excellent account of the neglected century of First Amendment history, see Rabban,
The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
85. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294
(1904). The "bad tendency" test offered little or no protection to speech; under this test, the state
could punish statements "inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to
crime, or disturb the public peace." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925).
86. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875); see also Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights applies only to federal government).
87. See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
88. See Rabban, supra note 84, at 559-79. In scholarship, at least, some English soil had been
transplanted. According to Henry Schofield, a commentator of that time, the First Amendment was
intended to give constitutional weight to the saying, "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall
make you free." Id. at 563 n.255 (quoting Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 AM.
Soc. Soc'y: PAPERS & PRoc. 116 (1914)).
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B. The Espionage Act Cases-Holmes Misreading Holmes
In 1919, the Supreme Court heard four crucial cases challenging gov-
ernment prosecutions for anti-war articles and speeches: Schenck v.
United States,89 Frohwerk v. United States,90 Debs v. United States,91 and
Abrams v. United States.92 In each case, the Court upheld the convictions.
In practical results these cases did not deviate from the prevailing judicial
hostility to free speech claims. Despite some new language, the majority in
each case seems to have applied the traditional "bad tendency" test. Some
commentators have argued, with justification, that the Court treated the
cases as routine criminal appeals. 93 Why, then, are Schenck, Frohwerk,
Debs, and Abrams generally considered the origins of First Amendment
law?
The answer is found not in holdings but in rhetoric-the rhetoric of
Justice Holmes. The following passage from Schenck soon became the
classic First Amendment standard:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within
their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the ef-
fect of force . . . . The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree."'
Schenck was the Supreme Court's first consideration of the Espionage
Act of 1917, which provided that any attempt or conspiracy to cause in-
subordination in the military, to obstruct recruiting or enlistment, or to
interfere with the operations of war would be punishable by a fine not
exceeding $10,000 and/or imprisonment of up to twenty years. Schenck,
general secretary of the Socialist Party, had supervised the printing of
anti-war circulars to be mailed to men who had passed the draft exemp-
tion boards. The circular was two-sided. On one side it "intimated [in
impassioned language] that conscription was despotism in its worst form,"
89. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
90. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
91. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
92. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
93. See Rabban, supra note 84, at 585 n.39 5.
94. 249 U.S. at 52.
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but "in form at least confined itself to peaceful measures such as a petition
for the repeal of the [Conscription Act]."" 5 The other side alleged that it
was everyone's constitutional duty to "maintain, support and uphold" the
"right to assert your opposition to the draft."9 The right claimed was
therefore not physical opposition to the draft, but the "right to assert your
opposition." Thus, the circular was first an argument for the right of free
speech and petition, and only derivatively an opposition to the war effort.
Its author was found guilty on both counts.
In his opinion for the unanimous Court, Holmes treated the free speech
issues in a single paragraph. He assumed that the author's intent was to
obstruct the war effort and not to assert the rights of free speech: "Of
course the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended
to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to
have upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct
the carrying of it out."917 Assuming that "bad tendency," Holmes went on
to establish the "clear and present danger" test, in the passage quoted
above.
Undertaking the contextual analysis that the clear and present danger
test mandated, Holmes emphasized that constitutional rights are dimin-
ished in wartime. As a descriptive matter, this is certainly accurate,98 but
as a normative statement of constitutional law it deserves more than the
sentence Holmes gave it. He also offered two inapposite examples relating
to context: falsely shouting fire and "words that may have all the effect of
force." As to the first, truth and falsity were not at issue here. In the case
Holmes cited to support the second example, Gompers v. Bucks Stove and
Range Co.,9 words that signaled the beginning of a boycott were enjoined
because the Court found that they amounted to "verbal acts;" in other
words, they had all the effect of force. The insertion of the word "may" in
Holmes' characterization of the Gompers holding suggests a continuation
of the bad tendency test.
The suggestion that the bad tendency test lived on in the original appli-
cation of the clear and present danger test is borne out in the rest of the
paragraph, as Holmes treated the constitutional issue as subsumed by the
statutory issue of conspiracy versus actual obstruction. Because the Act
prohibited conspiracy and actual obstruction identically, Holmes con-
cluded that no obstruction need be shown: "[I]f the act, (speaking, or cir-
culating a paper), its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the
95. Id. at 51.
96. Id.
97. id.
98. See, e.g., Hall, Free Speech in War Time, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1921).
99. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants mak-
ing the act a crime."100 If the "clear and present danger" test as applied
in Schenck had been a strong misreading of the prevailing "bad tendency"
test, the fact that the statute punished both conspiracy and actual obstruc-
tion would not have been dispositive of the constitutional question. By
focusing on the statute, Holmes intimated that judicially-determined in-
tention collapses the distinction between rhetoric and action. The tendency
is all.
The clear and present danger test introduced in Schenck, then, is a
weak misreading, if a misreading at all, of the "bad tendency" test. What
appears rhetorically to be a swerve from tradition was in fact a straight
line. Holmes established the outline of a new test, but applied an old one.
As several scholars have pointed out, 01 the analysis in Schenck is indistin-
guishable from that of Fox v. Washington,0 2 an earlier Holmes opinion
upholding a Washington state statute that made it criminal to print mat-
ter "which shall tend to encourage or advocate disrespect for law."' 3 Like
John Milton before him, Holmes' theory and practice in Schenck failed to
live up to his rhetoric, at least insofar as the rhetoric has subsequently
been misread.104 As Robert Cover has succinctly stated, the clear and pre-
sent danger test was "born as an apology for repression." 0 5 But as with
John Milton, it was Holmes' rhetoric, rather than his specific actions,
that proved influential in the development of the theory of free speech.
One week after Schenck the Court upheld two more Espionage Act con-
victions. These cases-Frohwerk and Debs-only magnify the weakness of
Holmes' Schenck opinion. In unanimous opinions also penned by Holmes,
the First Amendment question was twice held to have been "disposed of
in Schenck."10 In Frohwerk, Holmes found "not much to choose between
expressions" in several newspaper articles criticizing the war effort and
the circulars at issue in Schenck.107 The fact that the newspapers in
Frohwerk were not directed to enlisted men was disposed of with a
metaphor:
[I]t is impossible to say that it might not have been found that the
circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would
100. 249 U.S. at 52.
101. See Rabban, supra note 84, at 585; Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27
NOTRE DAME LAW. 325, 329 (1952).
102. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
103. Id. at 275.
104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. Cover, The Left, the Right, and the First Amendment: 1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REv. 349,
372 (1981).
106. Debs, 249 U.S. at 215.
107. 249 U.S. at 207.
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be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied
upon by those who sent the paper out.108
The metaphor's subliminal allusion to "falsely shouting fire" gives it rhe-
torical power, but fails to obscure the fact that the metaphor does not
answer the question of how clear and present the danger must be. The
negative phrasing affirms that it is immaterial that no findings of "inflam-
mability" were made. Under the Frohwerk analysis, it seems, the danger
need be neither clear nor present.
The Debs opinion further reveals the weakness of the clear and present
danger test. Eugene Debs, a Socialist Party candidate for President, was
convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for giving a speech on
"socialism, its growth, and a prophecy of its ultimate success."' 09 Debs
made no explicit call to obstruct either the war or conscription, although
he did praise several persons who had been convicted of doing so. The
emphasis in Holmes' opinion was not on clear and present danger, but on
the indicia of purpose and intent required by the criminal statute. Once
again the statutory question subsumed the constitutional issue. Holmes
found the jury warranted in determining that:
[Olne purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not does not mat-
ter, was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and that the
opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect
would be to obstruct recruiting. . .[and] that would be its probable
effect . . . .
Thus, Holmes' opinions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs appear to
have effected little or no change in the prevailing legal approach to the
suppression of speech. The fact that each garnered the support of a unani-
mous Court underscores this conclusion; given the rules of precedent, una-
nimity will rarely signal radical change.
Eight months later, in the next Espionage Act case, Abrams v. United
States,"' Holmes broke from the majority line that he had helped estab-
lish. His dissent may mark as strong a self-revision as American legal
culture has known. At the time, the revision drew only one other vote,
that of Justice Louis Brandeis. But when scholars and Justices declare
that modern First Amendment history begins with Schenck, it is because
of Abrams. Schenck is now read and cited as a gloss on the Abrams dis-
sent, not as the "bad tendency" test that it truly was. In Abrams, Holmes
108. Id. at 209.
109. 249 U.S. at 212.
110. Id. at 214-15.
111. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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strongly misread not only binding legal precedent, but precedent that he
himself had very recently authored. In thus dissenting from himself,
Holmes battled an authority more immediate and perhaps more powerful
than any other precursor.
The subject for Holmes' revision in Abrams was not significantly dis-
tinguishable from the subjects of his previous unanimous opinions. The
defendants were five Russian sympathizers who had printed 5,000 leaflets
protesting the government's policy toward Russia and calling on other
Russian sympathizers, particularly munitions workers, to respond with a
general strike. The leaflets were distributed in a somewhat haphazard
manner-"some by throwing them from a window of a building where
one of the defendants was employed and others secretly, in New York
City. 11'  The defendants were charged with a four-count indictment, of
which only the last two counts need concern us, as the Court refrained
from ruling on the constitutionality of the first two. Count three charged
conspiracy to publish language "'intended to incite, provoke and en-
courage resistance to the United States in [the war with Germany].' "113
Count four charged conspiracy "'to urge, incite and advocate curtailment
of production of things and products, to wit, ordnance and ammunition,
necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.' """4
The Supreme Court, with Justice Clarke writing for a majority of
seven, affirmed the convictions on counts three and four. The majority
dismissed the petitioner's First Amendment claims in one sentence, citing
Schenck. There was no explicit discussion of the proximity or degree of
danger, though a throwaway phrase, characterizing New York City as
"the greatest port in our land, from which great numbers of soldiers were
at the time taking ship daily, and in which . . . war supplies . . . were
• ..being manufactured," 1 5 suggests some attempt to consider context.
The only intent clear on the face of the leaflets was opposition to the
Russia policy, which was not punishable because we were not at war with
Russia. The majority, however, found constructive intent to obstruct the
war with Germany on the grounds that "[mien must be held to have in-
tended, and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely
to produce." ' 8 Without assessing the likelihood that the defendants'
speech would in fact obstruct the war effort, the Court found that:
[T]he manifest purpose of such a publication was to create an at-
tempt to defeat the war plans of the Government of the United
112. Id. at 618.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 622.
116. Id. at 621.
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States, by bringing upon the country the paralysis of a general strike,
thereby arresting the production of all munitions and other things
essential to the conduct of the war.
117
Thus, the majority remained faithful to the approach taken in Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs, and any potential protection promised by the "clear
and present danger" test was lost in the equation of bad tendency and evil
intention.
Despite obvious similarities to the three previous cases in which he had
written unanimous opinions, Holmes dissented in Abrams. Abrams thus
marks the first non-unanimous decision in the Espionage Act cases. As
Professor Cover has noted, "[b]y dissenting in Abrams, then, Holmes not
only argued that the Constitution tolerated dissent, he also exemplified
the dissent."11 That the first dissenter was the same man who had led the
unanimous Court only eight months before attests both to the strength of
Holmes' misreading and to the ability of the judicial structure to accom-
modate individual initiative.
Holmes' dissenting opinion is more persuasive rhetorically than logi-
cally, but again, it is the rhetoric that lives on.' 19 The lasting power of the
Abrams dissent lies in its restatement of the "clear and present" danger
test, particularly when read in light of the opinion's well-known final par-
agraph. Holmes revised the test he had enunciated in Schenck by elaborat-
ing on the elements of proximity and degree. The danger must be "imme-
diate" and of virtually revolutionary proportions, so that "an immediate
check is required to save the country.'120 The immediacy must also be
tangible: "Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to
leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any excep-
tion" to First Amendment protection.1
These elaborations give concrete meaning to the formal outlines of
"clear and present danger." It seems probable that had Holmes suggested
these specific thresholds in his original formulation, he would not have
117. Id. at 622.
118. Cover, supra note 105, at 373.
119. For example, Holmes continued to be preoccupied with the question of intent. He considered
it here in two contexts-first as a statutory requirement for the conviction, and second as a part of the
constitutional "clear and present danger" test. He raised the question of statutory intent only "to show
what I think," asserting after a confusing paragraph that the question was in any event superseded by
the First Amendment issue. 250 U.S. at 627. After a revisionary restatement of the clear and present
danger test, he argued that the test required a showing of "actual intent" and that here, "[a]n intent to
prevent interference with the revolution in Russia might have been satisfied without any hindrance to
carrying on the war. ... Id. at 628. Thus, Holmes can be said to have decided the specifics of the
case on the question of intent alone. His analysis in Abrams suggests that he would not have required
a showing of actual danger, but only of a clear and present intent to be dangerous.
120. Id. at 630 (emphasis supplied).
121. Id. at 630-31.
Vol. 95: 857, 1986
Agon at Agora
enjoyed majority support, nor could he have upheld Schenck's conviction.
Yet his elaboration in Abrams reads as if it is only a clarification, rather
than a revision, of the earlier test. Thus, he exploits the precedential
weight of the Schenck formulation while infusing it with new meaning by
an antithetical reading. So revised, the clear and present danger test had
the potential to offer substantial protection for speech. For the rest of his
tenure, Holmes would only rarely concur in the suppression of speech,
and his revised test outlived his presence on the Court by decades.
At least as crucial as the reformulation of the test was the opinion's
final paragraph. There, in dissenting dicta cited more frequently than
many majority holdings, Holmes set out the underlying philosophy of his
clear and present danger test. In keeping with the opinion's general tone,
the paragraph opens ironically:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.122
"Perfectly logical." The irony launches an understated attack on the cer-
tain tones of the majority, and allies the dissenter with those humble
enough to recognize the possibility of imperfection, illogic, and doubt. The
irony also makes it clear that a "but" will be forthcoming. The passage
that follows established the theoretical foundation for all subsequent de-
velopment of First Amendment law:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Con-
stitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year
if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy
based upon imperfect knowledge.12
This statement laid the ground for Mill's eventual triumph over Black-
stone in the Supreme Court. Given this underlying philosophy, which
Holmes attributes not only to the First Amendment but to the notion of
constitutional government itself, limiting First Amendment protection to
122. Id. at 630.
123. Id.
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speech without "bad tendencies" and to Blackstone's prohibition of prior
restraints is plainly insufficient.
The market metaphor introduced by Holmes' "free trade in ideas" con-
cept invokes a laissez-faire conception of the role of government in the
regulation of speech. Grounded not so much on the efficiency of the eco-
nomic market as on the "imperfect knowledge" of participants and over-
seers alike-in contrast to the purely economic model, which assumes per-
fect knowledge for all-Holmes' market nevertheless relies on an
"invisible hand." "[Tihe best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . ." Holmes' test
recalls and misreads Milton's vision of the struggle between truth and
falsehood:124 Milton's wrestling match becomes Holmes' trading market.
The directness of the encounter is lost in the translation; popular accept-
ance replaces raw strength as the test for truth. At the same time, Holmes
seems to have endorsed the imperfection of Locke's ignorant man and rec-
ognized the distorting influence of persecution based on ignorant certainty.
His "free trade in ideas" concept captures these British theories in a pecu-
liarly American metaphor, suggesting the ideal of the small business econ-
omy-free, self-interested participation by individuals and a laissez-faire
role for government.
Holmes' last paragraph draws rhetorically on two sources, both of
which are misread to justify Holmes' own revisions. First, Holmes stresses
the uncertainty of human knowledge and suggests that our system of gov-
ernment, and particularly the First Amendment, was devised to take that
uncertainty into account by allowing freedom to change. This suggestion,
which Holmes roots in the Constitution, indirectly rationalizes Holmes'
own move to a dissenting position from the unanimity of the previous
majorities. Second, Holmes invokes the "invisible hand" of laissez-faire
economics through a metaphorical misreading, thereby cloaking his uncer-
tainty in the scientism of economic theory. The two misreadings serve dif-
ferent rhetorical purposes, respectively emphasizing and resolving doubt.
Like Holmes' treatment of the clear and present danger test, however,
both rhetorical moves present something new and original-Holmes' vi-
sion of free speech-in terms that are established and accepted-the Con-
stitution, and laissez-faire economics. With "free trade in ideas," the clear
and present danger test, and ultimately the Constitution itself, Holmes
makes the metaphor his own as he exploits the traditional authority of its
literal terms.
That the Abrams dissent plays a central role in First Amendment case
law and scholarship is not disputed. Holmes' self-misreading creates out
124. See supra note 71.
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of an "apology for repression" a test that protects speech, and out of a
long tradition of British theory a peculiarly American metaphor. Why
Holmes' self-revision surfaced when it did is a subject of much academic
curiosity. The explanations include: Holmes biding his time;12 letters
from Learned Hand;.2 a New Republic article by Ernst Freund criticiz-
ing the Debs decision; 2' and Professor Chafee's "Freedom of Speech in
War Time," published in the Harvard Law Review.12 What is crucial
for our purposes, however, is not so much why Holmes revised himself,
but that he did it, that he could not admit that he did it, and that it had
such far-ranging consequences. With Abrams, the undercurrent of agonis-
tic struggle within a single man surfaces in a dissent, and that dissent soon
gains more precedential power than the three unanimous opinions that
preceded it. The Abrams dissent not only breaks from and misreads the
authority of precedent, it ultimately becomes the authoritative precedent
itself. Under conventional doctrine, the precedential value of dissent is
minimal at best; here, however, the successful agonistic struggle super-
sedes pure doctrine.
Holmes is celebrated as a preeminent contributor to modern First
Amendment jurisprudence almost entirely on the strength of his dissents.
His authorship of the now-embarrassing, unanimous Frohwerk and Debs
opinions is largely forgotten, while his "free trade in ideas" metaphor
lives on as a theoretical foundation for freedom of speech. If Holmes had
been content to command a unanimous Court in the suppression of
speech, he would not have the First Amendment stature he holds today.
That stature was won by breaking from the majority, breaking from tra-
dition, and even breaking from his own previous statements. The break
transformed Holmes from the leader of a majority to a voice in dissent,
where he remained for the rest of his tenure. Yet, despite the rules of
precedent, and despite the weight of tradition, it is Holmes' dissents that
guide us to this day.
C. Democratizing an Ideal-Brandeis' Misreading
Justice Brandeis' contributions to the development of free speech juris-
prudence are distilled in his concurrence in Whitney v. California.129 Al-
125. See Chaffe, supra note 67.
126. Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 720 (1975).
127. Kalven, Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 235
(1973).
128. Rabban, supra note 84, at 586-94; see also Rogat & O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dis-
senting Opinion-The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1349, 1376-78 (1984) (discussing and criti-
quing several of above explanations).
129. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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though concurring in the result, Brandeis' opinion dissented sharply on
the law.130 As Holmes had done in Abrams, Brandeis retained the outline
of the Schenck clear and present danger test, but filled it with new mean-
ing, substituting an essentially political justification for Holmes' quasi-
economic reliance on the discovery of truth through free trade in ideas.
131
Brandeis, who never used Holmes' market metaphor, shifted the focus of
the First Amendment from the pursuit of transcendent truth to subjective
individual freedom and intersubjective political deliberation. Brandeis'
misreading eventually proved as influential as Holmes' own misreading.
And like Holmes, Brandeis introduced his alternative vision in a separate
opinion, without precedential weight, which went on to become a corner-
stone in First Amendment theory.
The Whitney case involved a conviction for "assisting in organizing, in
the year 1919, the Communist Labor Party of California, [for] being a
member of it, and [for] assembling with it."113 2 Whitney challenged her
conviction on the ground that the criminal syndicalism statute, as applied,
deprived her of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of liberty, due
process and equal protection. The majority disposed of her free speech
argument, subsumed in the Fourteenth Amendment liberty claim, with
two sentences and a cite to Gitlow v. New York, 33 in which the Court had
previously adopted a reasonableness test for legislation directly criminaliz-
ing speech.
In his concurrence, Brandeis gave the free speech issue his undivided
attention. He began by rejecting the majority's reliance on Gitlow-"the
enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which are essen-
tial to its validity."13 4 Brandeis then applied the clear and present danger
test, and in doing so, offered his misreading of its underlying philoso-
phy-that political deliberation of public issues must be free from sup-
pression in a representative democracy.
In his reformulation of the philosophy of the First Amendment, Bran-
deis generalized the specific source of Holmes' market theory by attribut-
ing it to the Founding Fathers, and subsumed it within his own political
model of a self-governing citizenry. According to Brandeis, the Founding
Fathers:
believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
130. The Whitney concurrence was originally written as a dissent to Ruthenberg v. Michigan,
273 U.S. 782 (1927), a case which was mooted when Ruthenberg died. See Cover, supra note 105, at
384-85.
131. 274 U.S. at 372-80.
132. Id. at 372.
133. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
134. 274 U.S. at 374.
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are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be
futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protec-
tion against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a po-
litical duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.1 35
The reference to the Founding Fathers both clears the way for a misread-
ing of Holmes, Brandeis' immediate precursor, and eases judicial accept-
ance of the new formulation, suggesting that it is nothing more than a
faithful account of the Framers' views. Like Holmes before him, Brandeis
cloaked a revisionary misreading of more immediate precedent in the le-
gitimacy of constitutional origins.
Brandeis saw freedom of expression as both a means and an end. Mini-
mizing the importance of the search for objective truth, he emphasized the
development of the individual, the protection of minority voices, and the
maintenance of a reasoned political order. He stated that the "final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties . -". He
allied freedom of speech with minority rights: "Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that
free speech and assembly should be guaranteed."" 7 Most importantly, he
allied order, freedom of expression, and reason against force, repression,
and fear, and asserted that law falls in with the latter elements when it
restricts free speech:
[The Founding Fathers] knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repres-
sion; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable govern-
ment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting rem-
edy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason
as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced
by law-the argument of force in its worst form. 3 '
Like Holmes' dissent in Abrams, the rhetoric of Brandeis' concurrence
works on several levels at once. Its explicit distinction between reasoned
discourse and silent force implicitly criticizes the majority's two-sentence
dismissal of Whitney's First Amendment claim. By equating law and
135. Id. at 375.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 376.
138. Id. at 375-76.
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politics with rational dialogue, the concurrence privileges its own position,
as a voice relying solely upon the "power of reason," over that of the
majority, which carries the institutional threat of "fear through punish-
ment." Thus, the subject matter of free speech offers reflective rhetorical
support for Brandeis' dissenting point of view.
Elaborating on the distinction between reason and fear, Brandeis offers
a succinct and potent fragment of history: "Men feared witches and burnt
women."'1 9 He suggests further that "the function of speech [is] to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears." 4 It follows logically that any
restriction of speech based on fear will have domino-like repercussions:
The fear will only be exacerbated. Reason is the only justifiable basis for
suppression of speech-a reasoned judgment that serious violence is immi-
nent. Thus, the clear and present danger test as redefined by Brandeis:
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free
and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular gov-
ernment, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent
that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and falla-
cies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can
justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be recon-
ciled with freedom.1
4 1
Brandeis concluded that "free and fearless reasoning," the goal of free
speech, must provide the basis for any restriction of speech. As such, his
test seems somewhat circular; in fact, Brandeis' dynamic of speech, reason,
and fear may more closely resemble a spiral, establishing freedom of ex-
pression as absolutely prior. Once expression is restricted, free and fear-
less reasoning is endangered. Only if the restriction is itself based on rea-
son can the downward spiral be avoided. This leads one to wonder
whether reason and freedom of expression can ever be torn asunder, i.e.,
whether one can ever reasonably suppress speech. Brandeis encouraged
that doubt. He would allow suppression only where an emergency poses
the threat of "serious injury to the State."14 2 Any lesser evil, such as "[t]he
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property, is not enough to justify its suppression." 3
Brandeis' concurrence exemplifies the First Amendment values of free
139. Id. at 376.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 377.
142. Id. at 378.
143. Id.
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and fearless reasoning that it extolls, and links those values, and thus de-
rivatively its own voice, to the preservation of a democratic state. The
argument proceeds from fundamental premises to general conclusions with
clarity and brilliance. Reason and logic seem to break down in the opinion
only when Brandeis approaches the moment of suppression, but that is
Brandeis' very point. The reconciliation of authority and freedom de-
mands a rule of reason, and reason demands freedom of expression. Un-
less reason can exist independently of free speech-and Brandeis strongly
suggested that it cannot-suppression has no rational place.
The final foundation for Brandeis' theory of freedom of speech, how-
ever, is not reason itself, but the necessity for reason if deliberative democ-
racy is to prevail over arbitrary force. It is this political rationale for the
protection of speech that constitutes Brandeis' ultimate misreading of
Holmes. For Holmes, the foundation was truth, best approached through
the competition of free trade in ideas. Brandeis' substitution of rational
self-governance appears merely to develop the implications of Holmes'
recognition of uncertainty and his suggestion of a standard of popular ac-
ceptance. If we can know the truth only by popular approximation, per-
haps our concern in protecting speech should not be with truth itself but
with the process and results of popular deliberation, i.e., democracy.
Brandeis' revision grounds First Amendment theory in a democratic soci-
ety, where Holmes had posited an idealized social mechanism designed to
reach an objective ideal. Holmes' truth stood above mankind; Brandeis'
democracy is our invention.
These two theories of the First Amendment, one introduced in dissent,
the other in a concurrence that dissented in theory, still provide the two
major strains of First Amendment philosophy. Holmes' free trade in
ideas, through Brennan's misreading in Lamont v. Postmaster General,14 4
becomes the marketplace of ideas and ultimately justifies affirmative inter-
vention by the government in order to save not the state, but the market-
place itself. Brandeis' deliberative democracy was rediscovered some
twenty years later by Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, who in his own
agonistic effort to do battle with Holmes, gave Brandeis only three and a
half pages-though admittedly some credit-in his Free Speech and Its
Relation to Self-Government'45 Brandeis' theory, via Meiklejohn, finally
found its way into a majority opinion in 1964, with New York Times v.
Sullivan,146 another Brennan misreading.
Both Holmes and Brandeis made their mark on the First Amendment
tradition precisely by standing apart from the tradition as it then existed.
144. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
146. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Rather than respecting precedent, they spoke strongly for principles that
they felt required radical revisions of prevailing law. At the same time,
they sought support for their principles in the authority of the Constitu-
tion, and justified their own revisionary stances in the First Amendment's
concern for the dissenter. Their misreadings were "strong" ones; they
have withstood the test of history and gained acceptance "in the competi-
tion of the market." That their opinions, essentially voiced in dissent, now
carry the weight of precedent is itself a tribute to the First Amendment
theories that Holmes and Brandeis expounded. The agonistic struggle is,
after all, another form of Holmes' "free trade in ideas." Its interaction
with, and here, victory over precedential incorporation exemplifies the
room for greatness in the law.
IV. To THE MARKETPLACE-A MAP OF MISREADING
This Section will focus on Justice Brennan's "marketplace of ideas"
metaphor, a misreading which may warrant placing Brennan alongside
Holmes and Brandeis as a third antithetical "father" in the First Amend-
ment tradition. The direction taken from here must be somewhat arbi-
trary; the influence of Holmes' dissent and Brandeis' concurrence is such
that nearly every free speech case since 1927 involves either an explicit or
implicit misreading of their theories. That a dissent and concurrence
should have such significance demonstrates at once the influence of the
strong break from tradition and the ability of tradition to adapt; the anti-
thetical undercurrents that surfaced so strongly in Abrams and Whitney
have since been fully incorporated into the precedential mainstream.
In order to demonstrate the simultaneous operation of antithetical
struggle and precedential incorporation, this Section will follow a line of
cases that culminates, in 1981, in the incorporation of the Holmes, Bran-
deis, and Brennan approaches into a majority opinion upholding a right of
access to the broadcast media for political candidates."" This necessarily
selective map of misreading identifies four stops along the way: Martin v.
City of Struthers,148 Lamont v. Postmaster General,149 Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC,"'0 and CBS v. DNC.'51 Formally, the line includes a
sentence of dicta, a concurrence, a dissent, and two majority opinions. By
analyzing majority as well as separate opinions, this Section intends to
explore the ongoing dynamic between agonistic struggles and the pull of
the precedential mainstream.
147. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
148. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
149. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
150. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
151. 412 U.S. 94, 170 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A. Origins Again-The Right to Receive and the Marketplace of Ideas
In Martin v. City of Struthers, Justice Black swerved momentarily
from tradition in a seemingly throwaway phrase. Writing for a majority
that invalidated a municipal ordinance forbidding door-to-door canvassing
because it infringed the First Amendment right to distribute literature,
Black nonchalantly asserted a corollary right to receive information. "This
freedom embraces the right to distribute literature . . . and necessarily
protects the right to receive it." '152 The right to receive follows so logically
from the market metaphor and the right to distribute that it is surprising
both that Black was the first to mention it and that Black's comment, dicta
in Martin, failed to surface again for some twenty-two years.
The resurrection of Black's comment came at the hands of Justice
Brennan, concurring in Lamont v. Postmaster General.153 Lamont con-
cerned the constitutionality of a federal statute that required the Postmas-
ter General to detain, and deliver only upon the addressee's written re-
quest, unsealed foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda. 1 54
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held the statute unconstitutional
as "a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amend-
ment rights," 1 5 thereby implicitly incorporating Black's dicta. The major-
ity opinion, however, did not further develop the right to receive, focusing
instead on the government's obstructionist role in the free market of ideas.
Brennan, concurring, made explicit Douglas' reasoning. He began his
opinion by suggesting that "[t]hese might be troublesome cases if the ad-
dressees predicated their claim for relief upon the First Amendment rights
of the senders."1 58 The senders were by and large foreign citizens who
may not have had constitutional rights or standing to sue. Brennan briefly
discussed the potential problems of standing and of foreign propaganda,
concluding:
However, those questions are not before us, since the addressees as-
sert First Amendment claims in their own right: they contend that
the Government is powerless to interfere with the delivery of the
material because the First Amendment "necessarily protects the right
to receive it." Since the decisions today uphold this contention, I join
the Court's opinion.1 57
Rhetorically, Brennan's first paragraph glides effortlessly over the twenty-
152. 319 U.S. at 143.
153. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 305.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 307 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 308 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
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two year gap; he makes his rationale look easy by suggesting the difficul-
ties of an approach not taken.
Consolidating his gains, Brennan elaborated on the meaning of a right
to receive. He admitted that no specific guarantee of such a right exists in
the First Amendment, but insisted that the right to receive is nevertheless
a fundamental right, in that it is "necessary to make the express guaran-
tees fully meaningful."15' At this point, Brennan introduced an important
misreading of Holmes' free trade in ideas:
The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise will-
ing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.
15
'
The "marketplace of ideas" soon became a well-worn phrase. Its preva-
lence in judicial opinions and law journal articles is attributable in part to
its obvious bow to Holmes, but Brennan's revision is significant.
16 ° Bren-
nan localized the metaphor; he gave the market a sense of place. Brought
down from the Holmesian skies, the marketplace of ideas grounds "free
trade" in a specific locale and context. Though it is often made to do so,
Brennan's metaphor need not carry the baggage of economic theory that
Holmes expressly adopted. The marketplace of ideas, in Brennan's figura-
tion, conjures up the Greek "agora," the central meeting place for ex-
change. These ancient Greek marketplaces were much more than models
of market efficiency. Located at the center of town, they functioned as
public assemblies as well as markets; all hawkers, criers, buyers, and sell-
ers were admitted. The marketplace of ideas connotes diversity and plu-
ralism at ground level without resting on theories of abstract, truth-
generating invisible hands. The marketplace metaphor thus avoids some of
the conceptual weaknesses of Holmes' economic model, while focusing at-
tention on the process of exchange in a particular context or medium. In
this localized form, the metaphor has been applied to state fairs,1"' public
forums,'62 shopping centers, 6 3 academic settings,' 4 and the broadcast
media.1 15
158. 381 U.S. at 308.
159. Id.
160. Holmes' "free trade in ideas" occurs in only fourteen Supreme Court cases since 1925; Bren-
nan's "marketplace of ideas" is explicitly mentioned in 33 Supreme Court cases since its birth in
1965.
161. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 658 n.2 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
162. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981).
163. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 97 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
164. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
165. See CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 195 (1973) (Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting).
Vol. 95: 857, 1986
Agon at Agora
B. Red Lion-Incorporating the Marketplace
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,1"6 the marketplace of ideas and
the right to receive-with echoes of both Brennan and Holmes-were in-
corporated into a unanimous opinion. The centrality of these concepts to
the Red Lion result demonstrates at once the antithetical strength of
Holmes' and Brennan's misreadings and the ability of the precedential
mainstream to subsume such agonistic victors. Through a strong collective
misreading, authored by Justice White, the two concepts coalesce, justify-
ing affirmative government intervention in the broadcast media to protect
the rights of viewers and listeners to receive balanced information.
At issue in Red Lion was the constitutionality of the Federal Commu-
nication Commission's fairness doctrine, 67 as well as its regulations con-
cerning personal attacks and political editorials. Each of these provisions
involved the FCC in oversight of the content of certain programs; broad-
casters challenged the rules on traditional First Amendment grounds, ar-
guing that this oversight violated the principle of government content neu-
trality. 8  A unanimous Court upheld the challenged rules, justifying them
as protective of the collective rights of viewers and listeners "to have the
medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment."169 The Court's revision retained the language and meta-
phors of past authority-the marketplace of ideas and the right to re-
ceive-but extended them significantly to justify affirmative content-based
intrusion by government in an area previously defined by laissez-faire,
content-neutral principles. In doing so, the Court forged a new misreading
by bringing together the metaphors of Brennan and Holmes, generalizing
the uniqueness of each, as it specified that
the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by
the Government itself or a private licensee.1 70
The Court's misreading re-introduces Holmes' economic notions of truth-
generation to Brennan's marketplace, but also recognizes that government
166. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
167. The fairness doctrine required broadcasters to present a politically balanced viewing sched-
ule. If a program presented only one side of an issue, the network was required to broadcast another
program presenting the other side.
168. The First Amendment requires the government to maintain content neutrality in many con-
texts. This means that the government may not punish or deny a benefit on the basis of the political
content of a person's speech or ideas. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
169. 395 U.S. at 390.
170. Id.
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might need to play a preservationist role in a medium of ideas where the
free market has given way to monopoly capital.
The string cite that follows the passage quoted above indicates the ex-
tent and direction of the Court's revision of prior authority. Associated
Press v. United States' leads the string; in that case, a 1944 antitrust
decision by Justice Black, the Court held only that application of the
Sherman Antitrust Act to the Associated Press was not barred by the First
Amendment. The Red Lion Court's misreading effectively turns this limi-
tation on the freedom of speech into an affirmation of the government's
responsibility to maintain First Amendment values by controlling speech
in a monopoly setting. In support of this revisionary reading of Associated
Press, the Court appended cites to New York Times v. Sullivan,'
1 the
1964 Brennan opinion that resurrected Brandeis' self-government theory;
the Abrams dissent; Garrison v. Louisiana, '7  another 1964 Brennan
opinion that characterized speech as "the essence of self-government;"
174
and finally a Harvard Law Review article entitled "The Supreme Court
and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,"'7 5 also by
Justice Brennan. The specter of Justice Brennan's "uninhibited market-
place of ideas" looms large throughout the string cite and the rest of the
majority opinion, and behind Brennan stand Meiklejohn, Brandeis and
Holmes. The string cite serves as a quick reference to the map of misread-
ing that guides the opinion.
In Red Lion, government interference in the broadcast media was justi-
fied not by any clear and present danger to the state itself, but by the
threat of distortion in the marketplace of ideas. Because of scarcity, eco-
nomic barriers, and state-created advantages, the Court noted, the broad-
cast media is not naturally an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas," and
therefore limited content control is legitimate in order to ensure a robust
exchange of ideas. Although it is probable that neither Holmes nor Bran-
deis would have countenanced such an intrusion,17 1 it is certain that
Holmes' metaphor provided the groundwork for the justification. Holmes-
ian economics lent rhetorical support to the notion of federal oversight of
speech, for intervention in the economic realm to offset monopoly power
had long been accepted. It was Holmes' "free trade in ideas," localized in
171. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
172. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
173. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
174. 395 U.S. at 390.
175. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
176. Both Holmes and Brandeis specifically restricted government interference to situations where
the state itself was seriously and immediately threatened. See supra text accompanying notes 120,
141.
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the broadcast marketplace, which the government sought to preserve
through affirmative intervention. The Court in Red Lion thus turned
Brennan and contemporary economics on Holmes to reach a result radi-
cally opposed to that suggested by Holmes' original conception. A meta-
phor born in laissez-faire, after a series of misreadings, became the
groundwork for protectionism, as government intrusion was found justi-
fied to maintain the conditions for a twice-misread metaphor.
C. CBS v. DNC-A Retreat and Further Revision
Four years after the Red Lion decision, the Supreme Court retreated
somewhat in CBS v. DNC177 when a 6-3 majority held that the First
Amendment did not require broadcasters to accept editorial advertise-
ments. Judicial declaration of an affirmative obligation in this case would
have required an extension of Red Lion. Where Red Lion stated that the
First Amendment did not forbid necessary government interferences, a dif-
ferent result in DNC would have required a holding that the First
Amendment mandated intervention to ensure access. Chief Justice Burger,joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, found first that the broadcasters' actions
did not constitute state action, and that therefore there was no First
Amendment violation. Because this position did not command a majority,
Burger went on to discuss whether affirmative editorial access was re-
quired by either the "public interest" standard of the Communications
Act, or, assuming state action, by the First Amendment. Burger concluded
that the fairness doctrine upheld in Red Lion was sufficient to protect the
First Amendment rights of viewers and listeners, and that broadcasters
were therefore not required by the Constitution or the "public interest" to
accept editorial advertisements. In support of his conclusion, Burger spec-
ulated that mandatory editorial access would be biased in favor of the
rich, and that the administrative difficulties of implementation would be
prohibitive. 1 8
The case elicited five opinions; Justice Brennan offered the strongest, indissent. 1 9 Standing apart, Brennan presented an antithetical misreading
that extended the implications of his earlier majority opinions-New York
Times v. Sullivan'8" and Garrison v. Louisiana1 8
-and expanded upon
his concurrence in Lamont and his Harvard Law Review article. Like
Holmes before him, Brennan misread himself. If the self-revision here is
not quite so abrupt as Abrams, it may be because Brennan had at this
177. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
178. Id. at 123.
179. Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshal! joined Brennan's dissent.
180. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
181. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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point succeeded, in Red Lion, in incorporating his previous strong mis-
readings into the mainstream. With CBS v. DNC, however, he broke from
the majority once again.
Read in the light of Lamont, New York Times, and Garrison, the CBS
v. DNC dissent firmly establishes Brennan as a rebellious son to the two
strong fathers of the' First Amendment tradition. In dissent, Brennan drew
upon the strength of his precursors in a seemingly legitimate act of
straightforward incorporation, but swerved substantially at the last mo-
ment, finding a constitutionally mandated right of individual access far
beyond the fairness doctrine guarantees upheld in Red Lion.
Brennan disposed of his opponents on the primary level of dis-
course-the particular case-with a couple of pages and a footnote.
182
The real struggle begins in Section II of his dissent: Here Brennan looked
past the immediate opposition to his strong precursors. Section II opens
with a four-page discussion of the First Amendment tradition. The discus-
sion incorporates and misreads developments in the tradition since 1919,
and concludes as it begins, by citing Red Lion, an opinion that rested
squarely on Brennan's own marketplace metaphor. The Section's opening
invocation is thus framed by references to the strongest immediate precur-
sor (in both the antithetical and precedential senses). Its relation to that
precursor is strongly revisionary, however, as Brennan draws upon and
significantly extends the Red Lion holding.
Brennan's introductory discussion opens with a concession that broad-
casters have First Amendment rights, but at the same time reiterates the
countervailing collective right of "the people as a whole. 1
83 At the outset,
however, Brennan makes no claim for which way the balance between the
broadcasters and the public should tip, even though that question had
been decided in favor of the public in Red Lion. Brennan's apparently
objective opening stance serves two purposes: It lends his opinion the illu-
sion of impartiality, and allows him to incorporate a long line of First
Amendment theory into the Red Lion holding that "it is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."' "
182. Brennan's opening paragraph manipulates the split in the majority opinion to undercut its
substantive holding. Remarking that three of the seven Justices found insufficient government involve-
ment in broadcast decisions to raise any First Amendment interest, he concluded that the opinion of
those three on the substance of the First Amendment claim reduced to "mere dictum." 412 U.S. at
171 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Later, he dismissed Stewart's slippery slope concurrence-which
warned that a finding of state action here means that "private broadcasters are Government," id. at
133 (Stewart, J., concurring)-as a "complete misunderstanding," and corrected Stewart's mistakes in
a footnote. Id. at 181-82 n.12. Finally, Brennan argued that there was sufficient government involve-
ment in the broadcast media to raise First Amendment implications. Id. at 173.
183. Id. at 183.
184. Id. at 184 (citing Red Lion, 376 U.S. at 390).
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Brennan arrives at the Red Lion holding through his own revisionary
string cite. A comparison of his string cite with that in Red Lion'" sug-
gests the degree of Brennan's misreading. The string cite begins with
Holmes' market metaphor from the Abrams dissent, followed by a "see
also" to Whitney and Gitlow. Brandeis, who was conspicuously absent
from the Red Lion string, is thus sandwiched here between the two
Holmes dissents. Brennan's next cite, however, a quote from New York
Times v. Sullivan, invokes Brandeis' notion of self-government with a ref-
erence to the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." ' 6 This
Brandeisian notion is buttressed by citations to six more opinions, in par-
ticular those of Justice Douglas in Terminiello v. Chicago'"7 and of Jus-
tice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut.8" These additional authorities,
none of which is found in Red Lion, underscore the Court's long-standing
concern for societal or public First Amendment interests, and lead directly
and smoothly into a quotation of the Red Lion conclusion that the public
right is paramount.1 9 Brennan's string cite thus subtly increases the
weight on the public side of the balance, primarily by invoking Brandeis'
"political" justification for protecting speech.
Following the string cite, Brennan implicitly invoked his marketplace
metaphor, tying it at the same time to Holmes' own metaphor:
it has traditionally been thought that the most effective way to insure
this "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate is by fostering a
"free trade in ideas" by making our forums of communication read-
ily available to all persons wishing to express their views.190
The marketplace of ideas, with its suggestion of an unconstricted plurality
of buyers and sellers, provides the unstated foundation for Brennan's revi-
sion of Red Lion. Brennan focused first on the characteristics of the
broadcast marketplace, and specifically reevaluated the sufficiency of the
fairness doctrine in guaranteeing a robust exchange of ideas. He sharply
criticized the fairness doctrine, noting that it mandates only the presenta-
tion of "representative community views."'19' Brennan pointed out that
185. See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
186. 412 U.S. at 183 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
187. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
188. 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) ("[Freedom of Speech] is the matrix, the indispensable condition,
of nearly every other form of freedom.").
189. The only citation from the Red Lion string cite which is missing here is one of Brennan's
own, from Garrison v. Louisiana. Far from an oversight, its absence at this point allows its use in a
later, crucial turn in the opinion. See infra text accompanying notes 193-96.
190. 412 U.S. at 184.
191. Id. at 190.
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broadcasters retain virtually complete discretion under the doctrine, and
that together with the commercial reality that "angry customers are not
good customers," the doctrine often induces only bland, conventional cov-
erage of public issues.19 If the marketplace is to avoid monopolistic con-
trol, Brennan suggested, something further is required.
In search of a constitutional supplement or substitute for the inadequate
fairness doctrine, Brennan looked to the model of the legal system for
guidance: "Our legal system reflects a belief that truth is best illuminated
by a collision of genuine advocates."1 ' Shifting the focus away from the
editorial rights of broadcasters, he argued that a limited scheme of man-
dated editorial advertising would restore editorial control to speakers. In-
sofar as the majorities in Red Lion and CBS v. DNC had concentrated on
the fairness doctrine, they had neglected speakers' interests in favor of
listeners' rights. Brennan re-introduced the speaker to the balance in his
dissent with another revisionary string cite. The cite begins with Professor
Emerson's identification of the private First Amendment interest in self-
expression.1 94 The public implications of this private interest are sug-
gested by the next reference, to Garrison v. Louisiana: "Speech concern-
ing public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government."195 Following Emerson, speech here connotes the act of
speaking, not solely the information conveyed. Freedom of speech, Bren-
nan asserted, guarantees participatory rights, citing Thomas v. Collins,
1 96
a 1945 case that extended First Amendment rights not only to academic
discussions but to advocacy of action. A quote from Police Dept. of Chi-
cago v. Mosley 97 prepares the way for Brennan's conclusion:
For our citizens may now find greater than ever the need to express
their own views directly to the public, rather than through a govern-
mentally appointed surrogate, if they are to feel that they can
achieve at least some measure of control over their own destinies.
1 98
Truth has dropped out of the First Amendment equation by the string
cite's end; Brennan's reformulation offers more limited, realistic, and con-
crete hopes, and in so doing shifts the focus to individual speakers. The
market's test of truth gives way to the everyday exchange of the market-
place. Value lies not so much in the final result as in the process of ex-
192. Id. at 185-88.
193. Id. at 189.
194. Id. at 192-93.
195. 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
196. 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
197. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
198. 412 U.S. at 193.
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change. In Brennan's revision, foreshadowed by Brandeis, the act of ex-
change furthers important First Amendment interests, and therefore the
process itself deserves protection.
As noted above, Brennan's marketplace misreading localized the
Holmesian metaphor.1 99 In his CBS v. DNC dissent, Brennan justified
that revision:
[Fireedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary,
the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an
effective forum-whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town
meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency.200
Brennan's list of effective forums is conspicuously public; his allusion ear-
lier in the opinion to public forums begins to surface here.20 1 Localized in
the broadcast media, the marketplace of ideas itself becomes a public fo-
rum: "[W]ith the assistance of the Federal Government, the broadcast in-
dustry has become what is potentially the most efficient and effective
'marketplace of ideas' ever devised."20 2 It is "most efficient and effective"
not because of its generation of truth and good, but simply because, as
Brennan states in a footnote, "approximately 95% of American homes
contain at least one television set, and that set is turned on for an average
of more than five and one-half hours per day."20 3 In the realm of commu-
nication at least, television is America's agora, our marketplace of ideas.
Establishing television's function as a public forum strengthens consid-
erably the logic of Brennan's position; public forums, in First Amendment
doctrine, must be administered on a content-neutral, equal access basis,
and a restriction on political editorials appears to transgress this rule. In
this light, the ban on editorial access upheld by the majority begins to look
like content control, while Brennan's alternative of mandated access seems
to walk the line of content neutrality. Brennan's marketplace metaphor,
allied here with the public forum doctrine, effects a reversal of the major-
ity position. Where the majority characterized its decision as avoiding gov-
ernment interference, Brennan's recasting of the issue suggests that gov-
ernmental action is inevitable, and therefore should be content-
neutral-providing for editorial access-rather than content-
based-upholding a prohibition on access for political speech. Just as
Holmes and Brandeis had done before him, Brennan justified a revision-
199. See supra text accompanying notes 166-76.
200. 412 U.S. at 193.
201. See supra note 186.
202. 412 U.S. at 195.
203. Id. at 195, n.36.
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ary extension of law by invoking a metaphor and misreading an estab-
lished rule.
The marketplace metaphor also set the stage for Brennan's conclusion,
in which he argued that the majority decision favored "commercial" over
"controversial" speech. Brennan noted that the policies upheld by the ma-
jority granted greater access to big business' commercial advertisements
than to discussions of public issues. From Brennan's perspective, the ma-
jority had lost sight of the metaphorical nature of Holmesian economics.
Capitalism triumphs over politics in this marketplace, Brennan asserted:
Thus, as the system now operates, any person wishing to market a
particular brand of beer, soap, toothpaste, or deodorant has direct,
personal, and instantaneous access to the electronic media. He can
present his own message, in his own words, in any format he selects,
and at a time of his own choosing. Yet a similar individual seeking
to discuss war, peace, pollution, or the suffering of the poor is denied
this right to speak .
2 0
Brennan rested his CBS v. DNC dissent on three foundations: Red
Lion, the marketplace, and the public forum. Logically, the opinion pro-
ceeds in small steps: Red Lion values collective social rights of listeners
over private rights of broadcasters; the fairness doctrine fails to meet the
demands of that collectivity; the marketplace suggests a reciprocal ap-
proach, emphasizing the rights of speakers and listeners over middlemen
in a world where not truth but exchange is crucial; and therefore televi-
sion, America's premier marketplace, should be treated as a quasi-public
forum, to which individual speakers should have content-neutral access
through editorial advertising. Brandeis' concurrence in
Whitney-transforming the objectivity of Holmes' truth into subjective in-
dividual freedom and intersubjective democracy-speaks strongly through
Brennan's misreading. But at the center of Brennan's opinion lies the
marketplace, a forum defined by the intersection of public issues and self-
expression.
The rhetorical strength of Brennan's dissent is clear; it remains to be
seen whether that strength will be incorporated into the precedential
mainstream. The marketplace metaphor in itself has already achieved
prominence, and to a large extent has framed the terms of the debate.
Read as agora rather than as a free market funnel for truth, it carries
with it the underpinnings of Brennan's conceptual revision, evoking a
strong concern for access to effective communication-both listening and
speaking, buying and selling-on public issues.
204. Id. at 200.
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D. CBS v. FCC-Partial Incorporation
In CBS v. FCC205 the majority took its first tentative steps towards
incorporating Brennan's misreading. In that case, the Court upheld a stat-
ute granting individual access to the broadcast media for federal election
candidates. The decision, and the dispute between the majority and the
dissent, focused primarily on the statutory interpretation of § 312(a)(7) of
the Communications Act, but our concern is with the constitutional sub-
text. Considering the First Amendment claim, the majority's decision ap-
plied the spirit of Brennan's CBS v. DNC dissent to the sphere of federal
elections. Emphasizing the "enforceable public obligations" that a licensed
broadcaster must accept, the Court found that these obligations carry in-
creased constitutional weight in the realm of politics. Burger, writing for
the majority, quoted Buckley v. Valeo,206 Brennan's now-familiar phrase
from Garrison, and a line from Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy: "The First
Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office."2 °7 It is not enough to offer inde-
pendent news coverage of elections, the Court stated; candidates must be
allowed to speak for themselves. Thus, Brennan's concern for access tri-
umphed in a quintessentially Brandeisian setting. The marketplace meta-
phor is particularly fitting in the context of political campaigns; truth
largely drops out of the picture, as candidates promise, voters choose, and
popular acceptance carries the day. The underlying notion of self-
government through deliberative democracy, a Brandeis-Meiklejohn-
Brennan justification for free speech, finds its most immediate application
in the campaign context, and in CBS v. FCC that reading was incorpo-
rated to mandate individual access.
Brennan's misreading, partially adopted in Red Lion and CBS v. FCC,
but never fully endorsed by the majority, would extend the marketplace
concept to "social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and exper-
iences."20 8 His marketplace offers a strong revision of both Holmes and
Brandeis, even as it echoes them both. He localized Holmes' abstract met-
aphor, giving it a sense of place, freeing it of its economic baggage, and
focusing attention on participation, or access. He substituted Brandeis'
goals of self-definition and self-government through active participation
for Holmes' notion of objective truth, and his metaphor extended Bran-
deis' concerns beyond political speech. Brennan's revisionary relationships
to his two precursors are slightly different. Brennan clarified and rede-
205. 101 S.Ct. 2813 (1981).
206. 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976).
207. 401 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1971).
208. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
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fined Holmes' abstraction, and argued for government intrusion far be-
yond Holmes' conception. Toward Brandeis, Brennan took a less aggres-
sive stance, extending Brandeis' self-government revision beyond the
political sphere by giving it a concrete manifestation in the marketplace.
In the marketplace, or agora, choice and meaning for the individual and
society trump the destiny of overarching truth. Brennan's metaphor em-
phasizes communication and participation; it is process- rather than re-
sult-oriented. With regard to truth and falsehood, it is content-neutral.
With respect to access, it is radically affirmative. Despite Brennan's ap-
parent dissatisfaction with the extent to which his vision has not yet been
adopted, it is clear that the marketplace of ideas has played an important
revisionary role in the development of First Amendment jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
An antithetical reading of case law suggests that the development of
legal doctrine cannot be accounted for solely by rules of precedent. As we
have seen, a dissent or concurrence may prove far more influential than a
unanimous opinion. Influence appears to derive not only from the momen-
tum of the mainstream, but also from the radical misreading of an indi-
vidual agonistic victor. Bloom's emphasis on revisionary relations provides
an interpretive tool for identifying the misreadings of strong Justices. This
antithetical theory suggests, moreover, that legal analysis can at least as
profitably focus on dissents as on majority opinions.
Bloom's theory of hostile agonistic struggle claims to be the sole expla-
nation for the creative poetic process; he seeks to replace the traditional
account of a friendlier, incorporationist mode of creative revision with his
antithetical model. The law, however, largely because it involves the im-
position of force, must be based explicitly on the model that Bloom rejects.
This article does not argue that the incorporationist model is a ruse. My
revision of the conventional story might therefore be characterized as a
swerve; I do not deny outright the authority of precedent, but hope to
reveal it to be an incomplete account. At a minimum, I suggest that there
is a contradiction between what we identify as great and what we, at least
overtly, ask of a judge. We confer legitimacy on precedential fidelity but
reserve greatness for the radical break.
The contradiction is revealed most dearly at the moment of misreading.
There the Justice insists that he is legitimately following the law as prece-
dent requires, while he is actually altering the meaning of the authority
cited by his own interpretation. The moment of misreading reflects our
fundamentally ambivalent attitude towards authority. On the one hand,
we grant authority to those whom we regard as legitimate, because they
faithfully adhere to society's traditions, mores, and laws. On the other
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hand, we also assign authority to those who stand out as great, and who
in doing so simultaneously violate and redefine our traditions, mores, and
laws.
The specific character of legal misreading suggests that as a matter of
ideology, we assign more importance to legitimacy than to greatness, even
as legal structure and language leave room for both. Unlike the poet, the
judicial misreader can never admit that he misreads; the attempt to be
great must be shrouded in the language of precedential legitimacy. We
have made a choice, like the brothers in Freud's parable, to privilege so-
cial cohesion and order over individual initiative. But our choice, like
theirs, is fraught with ambivalance; we respect legitimacy, but celebrate
greatness. In the end, one cannot exist without the other. Our traditions
are born from breaks with past tradition, and are given new life from the
continuing redefinitions that strong misreadings confer. As long as the ag-
onistic hand remains hidden in the undercurrents our descriptive and nor-
mative accounts of adjudication will fall short of their critical task. Anti-
thetical analysis attempts to unveil this hidden hand.
